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RECENT CASES
ARREST-FDERAL AGENTS' STOPPING AUTOMOBILES To QuEsTION OOCUPANTS Is NOT AN ARREST AND EXOULPATORY STATEMENTS
THEREBY OBTAINED ARE ADmsSIBLE IF THERE WERE REASONABIE
GROUNDS To INVESTIGATE

State police officers in Apalachin, New York, had for some time been
investigating a local ex-convict 1 in connection with the manufacture and
distribution of illegal alcohol.2 In the course of this investigation, the
officers discovered that two men who had taken a motel room reserved
for them by the ex-convict's son had refused, when asked, to sign the motel
register. Federal agents were contacted, and together, the state and federal
officers drove onto the ex-convict's estate where they found twenty to
twenty-five cars parked. Suspecting a conspiracy to violate state and
federal alcohol laws, the officers established a checkpoint on the road
leading from the estate. They stopped all cars leaving the estate except
those driven by persons whom they knew, and questioned each occupant
as to his identity, occupation, criminal history, and reason for being at the
gathering. Later, the routine was altered and drivers were asked to go to
a nearby police station; this procedure was accepted without objection by
the remaining persons. Almost every individual questioned, either on the
road or at police headquarters, gave an exculpatory statement as to the
purpose of the gathering, generally tending to deny that it was prearranged.
No coercion was used to obtain these statements which were subsequently
offered into evidence at proceedings 3 to convict certain of those questioned
of a conspiracy to obstruct justice by having agreed to respond to inquiries
with "evasion, silence or lies." Over defendants' motion to suppress these statements on the ground that they had been obtained by illegal police
practices, the statements were held admissible. United States v. Bonanno,
180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
1 His conviction was for an OPA violation involving illegal acquisition of
sugar, a prime ingredient in the manufacture of alcohol. See United States v.
Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
2 The New York police also suspected the ex-convict of involvement in several
murders and disappearances in the area and knew of his connections with other
alcohol law violators. 180 F. Supp. at 75.
3 These statements were introduced both before a federal grand jury and at trial.
United States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
4 Motion was not made until after the trial had begun. 177 F. Supp. at 111.
For a discussion of the substantive aspects of the case, see 35 Novax DAME LAW. 446
(1960). See also Judge Kaufman's discussion of some of the procedural aspects of
the trial in The Apalachin Trial: Further Observations on Pre-Trial in Criminal
Cases, 44 J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y 53 (1960).
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The generally accepted definition of arrest is the "taking of a person
into custody in order that he may be forthcoming to answer for the commission of an offense." 5 The fourth amendment prohibition that "no
Warrants [for arrest or search] shall issue, but upon probable cause" has
been interpreted to require probable cause to validate any arrest or search
made with or without a warrant.6 Evidence obtained as the result of
a search and seizure, illegal because not founded on probable cause, is
inadmissible in federal courts.7 Despite articulations of this exclusionary
rule in search and seizure cases which impliedly extend it to all fourth
amendment rights,8 evidence obtained as the result of an illegal arrest has
9
been held admissible if voluntarily given.
Changes in the accepted definition of arrest may have been brought
about by the recent case of Henry v. United States,'° which held an arrest
illegal for want of probable cause. The Supreme Court viewed the arrest
as effected when the car in which defendant was riding was waved to a
halt by federal agents for the purpose of investigating a crime, "arrest"
being equated with an interruption or restriction of the liberty of movement.
But this otherwise clear declaration is of questionable standing as authority
because the prosecution in Henry conceded that the stopping was an
arrest." Thus a court might still choose a definition of arrest which does
not encompass stopping.12 But even to distinguish between stopping and
5 ALl CoDE Clm. P. § 18 (1930); Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA.
L. REv. 315, 344 (1942). An alternate view states that any deprivation of liberty
constitutes an arrest. Turney v. Rhodes, 42 Ga. App. 104, 155 S.E. 112 (1930);
Pratt v. Gross, 263 Ky. 521, 92 S.W.2d 788 (1936); 1 ALEXANDER, ARREST 353, 358
(1949).
6 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 7 132 (1925).
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) ; FED. R. CR-M. P. 41(e).
8
E.g., Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957); United States v. Freeman,
144 F. Supp. 669, 670 (D.D.C. 1956); Vlissidis v. Anadell, 262 F.2d 398, 400 (7th
Cir. 1959) (dictum).
9 Smith v. United States, 254 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Gibson v. United
States, 149 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir. 1945); United States v. Busby, 126 F. Supp. 845
(D.D.C. 1954) ; Dailey v. United States, 261 F.2d 870, 872 (5th Cir. 1958) (dictum) ;
United States v. Walker, 197 F2d 287, 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 877
(1952) (dictum).
10361 U.S. 98 (1959).
"The Court's language does, however, strongly indicate that the same conclusion might have been reached even absent the concession. Instead of terminology
such as "we assume without deciding," after relating the concession that the arrest
took place when the officers stopped the car, the Court agreed with the prosecution,
stating: "That is our view on the facts of this particular case. When the officers
interrupted the two men and restricted their liberty of movement, the arrest, for
purposes of this case, was complete." Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103
(1959). Thus the likelihood that Henry in fact controls the definition of arrestnotwithstanding the instant case-looms large. However, such a determination might
not compel reversal of the instant case. See notes 8-9 .supra and accompanying text.
Compare discussion at notes 22-26 infra and accompanying text.
12 The Bonanno court stated that in the absence of a specific statute (the statute
governing arrests by agents of the Alcohol Tax Unit, INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 7608,
was not adopted until 1958) state law governs what constitutes a technical arrest.
However, the case on which the court relied, United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581
(1948), does not decide this point, holding only that once it has been decided that
an arrest took place, state law is determinative of its validity. Other federal cases
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arrest does not necessarily legalize all stopping. Dictum in Carroll v.
United States 13 indicated that, absent probable cause for arrest, such an
interruption is never warranted. Courts have said 14 that the mere fact
that a traveler has a known criminal background, 15 or is seventy-five miles
from a national border, 16 or is a Mexican in Texas whose status as an
immigrant federal officers would like to investigate, 17 does not justify
stopping him. In certain circumstances, however, courts have found the
police practice of stopping and questioning legal despite the absence of that
probable cause which would make legal an arrest. Investigation of a
completed crime may warrant stopping cars in the area to question their
occupants.' s Stopping a car driven in a weaving fashion which does not
amount to a traffic violation has been held legal.'9 And where heavily
laden cars emerged-after a visit just long enough for them to load upfrom a place reputed to be a center for the distribution of liquor into a
dry state, stopping them was held legal.20
The instant case-reasoning that Henry did not represent a Supreme
Court holding on a contested issue 2 1 -chose not to follow that case's
involving arrests made by federal officers for federal crimes do not confine themselves
to state law, but base their holdings as to what constitutes a technical arrest on the
then generally accepted definition. Gilliam v. United States, 189 F.2d 321 (6th Cir.
1951) (stopping of defendant's vehicle by drawing alongside of it and telling defendant to pull over held not an arrest); Jenkins v. United States, 161 F.2d 99 (10th
Cir. 1947) (searching defendant for weapons held not an arrest). Since New York
has adopted the general definition by statute, N.Y. CODE Cmrm. P. § 167, the court's
choice makes no practical difference in the instant case.
13 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
14 Since all the cases which declare stopping illegal arose on motions to suppress
evidence of contraband found in the defendants' cars on the grounds it was illegally
seized, the courts might have confined their opinions to the search and seizure issue
without reaching the legality of the stoppings.
15 Clay v. United States, 239 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1956).
16 Moring v. United States, 40 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1930).
17 Ramirez v. State, 123 Tex. Crim. 254, 58 S.W.2d 829 (1933). State statutory
or common law embodies the same requirement of probable cause. Foote, Safeguards
in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. L. REv. 16, 40 (1957).
18 People v. King, 175 Cal. App. 2d 386, 346 P.2d 235 (Dist Ct. App. 1959);
State v. Hatfield, 112 W. Va. 424, 164 S.E. 518 (1932). Certain additional elements
were present in the King case: the occupants of the car stared rather too closely
at the police car as they passed it and then immediately turned into an alley.
19 Moore v. State, 306 P.2d 358 (Okla. Crim. 1957); Satterfield v. State, 196
Tenn. 573, 269 S.W.2d 607 (1954).
20 Smith v. United States, 264 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1959); McCarthy v. United
States, 264 F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1959). Both Smith and McCarthy were decided the
same day. Whether these cases are affected by Henry is unclear. The information
of the officers in Smith narrowly missed rising to the level of probable cause for
arrest. Cf. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (Court found probable
cause to exist where defendant was recognized as one previously arrested for illegal
transportation).
liquor
21
Bonanno also purported to distinguish Henry on the grounds that the Supreme
Court there confined its statement that stopping the car constituted an arrest to "the
facts of [that] particular case." See note 11 supra. The court, however, failed tc,
note the similarity between the stoppings in the two cases-all were for the purpose
of making a criminal investigation and were effected by waving the cars to a halt.
The instant case also attempted to distinguish Henry on the basis of the type of
evidence the stoppings produced: in Henry, contraband was seized from the car, as
compared with exculpatory statements which were volunteered to the officers. But
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declaration as to what constitutes a technical arrest. But even had the
court concluded that Henry was controlling as to the question of arrest,
such a conclusion would not have been dispositive of the issue of admissibility. Since the statements in Bonanno were given voluntarily, 22 what
authority there is would argue for admissibility even though the arrests-if
arrests there were-were illegal. The paucity of cases on the arrest side of
the fourth amendment may account for the failure of the courts to extend
the exclusionary rule from evidence obtained through illegal searches and
seizures 23 and during unreasonably long detentions 24 to evidence obtained
as a result of illegal arrest.25 The policy behind the rule-the protection
of constitutional liberties by denying to law enforcement agencies the fruits
of violation-argues that its application should be extended to the area of
illegal arrests.

26

The stoppings in Bonanno not being-in the court's view-arrests,
they need not have been supported by probable cause. Nevertheless, the
court did not sanction wholesale stoppings without any reason whatsoever.
It established a test which demanded something less than probable cause
for belief that a crime had been committed by requiring that the officer, at
2
the time of the stopping, have "reasonable grounds" for such a belief. 7
Formerly it was thought that only a thin, "troublesome" line separated
"mere suspicion," which cannot support an arrest, from probable cause
which does. 28 But courts which hold that stopping a traveler on the highway is legal despite the absence of probable cause, so long as some lesser
ground exists, are attempting to insert between the two older conceptsthe point at issue here is whether stopping is an arrest, the determination of which
is not affected by the sort of evidence uncovered as a result of stopping. It might
be noted that Henry was decided only nine days before Judge Kaufman made a
preliminary ruling on the defendants' motion to suppress the allegedly illegally obtained
evidence.
22 The court found no evidence that the police coerced or pressured the defendants into making the statements. Moreover, the statements given were exculpatory,
which argues for their voluntary nature. See United States v. Dornblut, 261 F.2d
949, 950 (2d Cir. 1958), where the fact that defendant thought a search would serve
to exculpate him by failing to turn up incriminating evidence demonstrated the
voluntary nature of the consent to search.
23 See note 7 mtpra.
24 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); FFD. R. Can,. P. 5(a).
25
Foote, supra note 17, at 39.
26 There is some difference in consequence between an illegal search and an illegal
arrest. Where the first takes place, the seizure of the evidence is decisive-the defendant would be powerless to limit its force were it to be admitted in evidence. The
defendant who has been subjected to an illegal arrest can, however, remain silent,
he has the presence of mind to do so.
providing
27
Instant case at 80. This test is similar to that proposed by Warner, supra
note 5, at 342, of "reasonable grounds to suspect," which when read in context means
something less than would constitute probable cause. In addition to reasonable
grounds, the instant case also required that there be an "absolute necessity for immediate investigatory activity." Instant case at 80. A situation involving a car
leaving the area with occupants unknown to the police would seem to meet such an
absolute necessity test. Cf. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176-77 (1949) ;
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 147 (1929).
28Brinegar v. United States, supra note 27, at 176.
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for mere suspicion is insufficient even for a stopping 2 9-a new one complete
in itself. Inasmuch as few courts have made clear declarations upon the
existence of or limitations on a right to stop and question, 30 such a determination of reasonableness of grounds for belief must be subjective to a
great degree. Judging "reasonable grounds" by looking to "the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life," 31 as one judges probable cause,
it would seem the officers' knowledge in the instant case meets the test
set forth.

CREDIT-IssUER'S RECOvERY FROm BONA FIDE CREDIT CARD
HOLDER FOR PURCHASES MADE BY UNAUTHORIZED PERSON REQUIRES
SHOWING THAT DUE CARE WTAS EXERCISED IN HONORING CARD

Defendant applied for and received a credit card from plaintiff oil
company. On the card's reverse side was a provision by which the holder
guaranteed payment of all charges made in connection with the card until
it be surrendered to, or written notice of its loss received by, the issuing
company.'

Defendant lost the card, and, before he reported its loss, the

finder, driving a stolen car, used it numerous times on a multistate junket.
In an action brought by the oil company to recover for the purchases made
before notice of loss was received, the trial court considered the defendant
bound by his contract but assumed that he would be "entitled to be excused
from the performance of the conditions if he acted as a reasonable man in

connection with his possession and use of the card." 2 On this theory the
jury found for the defendant. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Oregon
held that it was error for the trial judge to limit defendant's liability under

the contract to cases where he was negligent with his card. Ordering a
new trial, the court ruled that the oil company, in order to recover, would
have to prove that due care was exercised in permitting purchases to be
29

Smith v. United States, 264 F.2d 469, 471 (8th Cir. 1959).

If the Henry viewpoint is accepted, it is likely that few courts will allow
stopping and questioning without probable cause in the context of a criminal investigation. However, stopping cars for the sole purpose of checking licenses was held
legal in City of Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1959), and was assumed
to be legal in United States v. Bumbola, 23 F.2d 696 (N.D.N.Y. 1928), and Robertson v. State, 184 Tenn. 277, 198 S.W.2d 633 (1947).
31 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
30

1 See note 15 infra. The court refused to consider-because the issue had not
been raised below-whether the defendant was unaware of the guarantee provision
and thus not bound by its terms. The court said, however, that had the issue
been properly raised at trial, a jury question would have been presented as to whether
the conditions printed on the back of the credit card constituted a part of the contract.
Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 349 P.2d 243, 246-47 (Ore. 1960) (dictum). In other cases
involving credit cards with guarantee provisions, the assumption that the provisions
were binding was not challenged. See, e.g., Gulf Ref. Co. v. Williams Roofing Co.,
208 Ark. 362, 186 S.W.2d 790 (1945); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. McMillan, 168
S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
2 Union Oil Co. v. Lull, mipra note 1, at 247.
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made upon the card in each transaction for which recovery is sought. The
court further concluded that where, as in the instant case, circumstances
exist which indicate that reasonable inquiry should be made as to the
identity or authority of the purchaser, due care requires, at the least, that
such inquiry be made. 3 Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 349 P.2d 243 (Ore. 1960).
The early cases on the liability of credit card holders for unauthorized
purchases involved credit arrangements which did not include a guarantee
provision. Wanantaker v. Megary 4 likened a credit device to a negotiable
instrument and held the customer liable for its misuse. The reasoning and
result of that case were rejected in Lit Bros. v. Haines,5 which held that,
absent evidence of a contract to pay for unauthorized purchases, the cardholder is not liable. Similarly, in Jones Store Co. v. Kelly,6 the court
stated that liability would not be imposed where purchases were made by
a person in wrongful possession of the chargeplate. While this theory was
accepted in Gulf Ref. Co. v. Plotnick,7 allegations that the defendant cardholder was negligent in caring for the card and in notifying the issuer of
its disappearance permitted the court to hold that liability was a jury
question; it was also held that the jury was to consider the defendant's
contention that the individual stations had not exercised due care when
extending credit on the card. This "weighing of the negligences" is a
third alternative to the Megary and Haines opposing treatments of credit
arrangements which have no guarantee provisions.8 Where there was such
8 The circumstance in the instant case which the court thought indicative of a
need for inquiry was that, while the card listed defendant's residence as Oregon, the
purchaser was driving a car licensed in Idaho. See note 21 infra. In addition to
placing upon plaintiff the burden of proving due care, the court said that plaintiff
must also show "that the goods for which charges are made were in fact delivered to
the customer using the credit card." Id. at 254. The court handled the problem of
how the absence of due care on the part of independent contractors-service stations
of oil companies associated with plaintiff in the credit plan, as distinguished from
plaintiff's agent-subsidiaries-affected plaintiff's rights against the cardholder by
assuming that the oil company's cause of action was based on an assignment. Thus,
plaintiff was in no better position than that of the negligent independent dealer. For
a discussion of alternative sources of plaintiff's cause of action in this respect and
their effects on defendant's liability, see Comment, The Tripartite Credit Card Transaction: A Legal Infant, 48 CALiF. L. REv. 459, 484-88 (1960); Note, 35 NoTRE
DAME LAW. 225, 226-30 (1960). Despite the commonplace status which credit cards
now enjoy, surprisingly few cases appear which deal with their misuse. In most
instances, the issuing company apparently would rather pay the individual creditors
and absorb the loss than incur possible bad publicity by instituting suit. Increasing
outer limits on the amount of charges, however, may herald increased litigation in
this area, calling for effective legal treatment of credit cards which may be used in
a multiplicity of places and for various purposes. See generally Comment, srupra.
The opinion states that the defendant kept the
4 24 Pa. Dist. 778 (C.P. 1915).
credit key in an insecure place and, as the person who made the loss possible, should
bear the loss. This statement substantially weakens the seeming all-inclusiveness of
the court's analysis.
598 N.J.L. 658, 121 Atl. 131 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
6225 Mo. App. 833, 836, 36 S.W.2d 681, 683 (1931) (dictum).
724 Pa. D. & C. 147 (C.P. 1935).
8 Which alternative is preferable is of more than historical significance, for,
whenever it has decided that the credit arrangement does not include a guarantee
provision, a court can be expected to follow the analysis of one of the three prototypes. See Comment, supra note 3, at 481-82.
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9
a provision, MagnoliaPetroleum Co. v. McMillen held it to be no defense

that the purchases for which the card was used were unauthorized; the
defendant cardholder was liable under the contract. But even with a
guarantee provision, evidence that individual creditors had not acted in
good faith when charging purchases to the card prompted the court, in
Gulf Ref. Co. v. Williams Roofing Co.,'0 to dismiss plaintiff oil company's

action for want of equity.
The instant case, like Magnolia, held that the purchases in question
came within the guarantee provisions of the contract. Nor was it a defense
that the unauthorized purchases did not result from negligence on the part
of defendant." But in remanding for a new trial, the court required plaintiff to carry the burden of proving that the individual service stations had
exercised due care in charging the sales to defendant's account. 12 Whether
plaintiff must prove due care or defendant its absence, 13 the party so burdened finds itself-in the circumstances of the instant case-defeated: it
would be highly improbable that a service station attendant would be able
to recall his actions in regard to any particular transaction, whether or not
due care was in fact exercised; and the costs of locating the proper witnesses and taking depositions would exceed the amount in controversy.
The Oregon court has, then, cast upon the oil company all losses that occur
as a result of misuse of its credit cards. 14 Inasmuch as this result seems
directly contrary to the purport of the parties' contract in allocating the
9 168 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
10208 Ark. 362, 186 S.W.2d 790 (1945). There was evidence of fraud and
collusion on the part of the individual dealers.
11 Instant case at 247. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
12"The theory of liability expressed in Gulf Refining Co. v. Plotnick,
appeals to us as basically sound, i.e., that both the card owner and the card issuer
must show the exercise of care, the former in the custody of his card and the latter
in making reasonable inquiry when it is used." Instant case at 249. But while this
theory of liability may or may not be sound, it is doubtful that it finds support in
Plotnick. There, the issue, on motion for judgment n.o.v., was whether defendant's
negligence had rendered him liable; in the instant case, the converse contentionthat defendant's freedom from negligence precluded recovery-had already been dispensed with by the court. See note 11 supra and accompanying text. Second,
Plotnick did not involve a written contract and both plaintiff and defendant alleged
the other's negligence; in the instant case, plaintiff's action was based on a contractual provision. And third, Plotnick, even if implying that plaintiff must be free
from negligence in order to recover, does not speak to plaintiff's burden to prove
that he had exercised due care.
13 Once the court had held that the contract was to be interpreted as including
a promise on the part of the plaintiff oil company to exercise due care, the pleading
and proving of its performance is not an illogical burden to impose on the company.
Practical considerations as well speak for this choice: it is the plaintiff who has
the prior contractual relationship with the individual dealers, who possibly has
some control over them, and who is in the better position administratively to obtain
the information and introduce it into evidence. The court in the instant case felt
obliged, however, to analogize from the law pertaining to lost and stolen negotiable
instruments to justify its placing of the proof burden. Instant case at 254.
14 Practical reasons dictate that the issuing company, rather than the individual
creditors, bear this loss. Since the issuer is dependent upon a broad base of creditorparticipants-especially in those credit plans where the issuer itself sells no commodity-it must absorb the risks of nonpayment in order to gain and keep the participation of individual sellers. See Claflin, The Credit Card-A New Instrument,
33 CONN. B.J. 1, 3 (1959); Comment, supra note 3, at 464-65.
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risks, it can be justified only by a determination of the true intentions of the
parties or by the dictates of a compelling public policy.
The court was faced with clear words 15 representing an agreement
to share the risk: the oil company will underwrite all losses that occur after
receipt of notice, the cardholder all those that occur before. The court
admitted that the bargain was not an unreasonable one and expressly said
that the plaintiff company was entitled to its terms.16 Such a view, however, did not preclude the court from attempting "to determine the meaning which the parties attached to their bargain." 17 The court classified the
contract as an indemnity-type agreement, the classification being relevant
to determining the parties' intentions in that "indemnity agreements
normally expose the indemnitor to liability through the conduct of others
over which he has little or no control." 18 Also relevant in the court's
view were the facts that defendant "is not engaged in the indemnity business, and therefore without opportunity to calculate his risks and charge a
premium accordingly . . . [and that] defendant is essentially a gratuitous
indemnitor . ... ," 19 From this analysis, the court concluded that it had
before it an example of a contract susceptible to treatment "as embodying
an implied promise . . . to exercise reasonable diligence . . . in transactions which may create indemnity liability." 20 If the court had implied
this promise solely because of what it thought must have been the intentions of the parties, its unrealistic finding could have been expected to be
upset by renegotiation in future transactions, relegating the holding to a
lesson in more clearly written contracts. However, the court implied the
same promise by analogizing from what it considered a related area of the
law, bank passbooks, 21 where the duty owed by the company to its customer
15 "The customer to whom this card is issued guarantees payment within 10
days of receipt of statement, of price of products delivered or services rendered to
anyone presenting this card, guarantee to continue until card is surrendered or
written notice is received by the company that it is lost or stolen." Instant case at 245.
16 Id. at 247.
17 Id. at 249.
18 Ibid. More accurately, the contract was classified as one of "suretyship, guaranty or indemnity." For the court's purposes, which category is most accurate was
irrelevant. It chose indemnity for convenience.
19 Id. at 249. Admitting that there may be some benefit accruing to the defendant from "the convenience of the use of the credit card," the court said that the
plaintiff oil company "received a benefit consisting of adding another potential customer for the sale of its products by facilitating purchases through the convenient
use of credit" Id. at 249-50. The court apparently concluded from this that the
defendant benefited less from the arrangement than did the oil company.
20 Instant case at 250. For this conclusion, the court cites Gulf Ref. Co. v.
Williams Roofing Co., 208 Ark. 362, 186 S.W.2d 790 (1945). That case, however,
turned on the failure of the service stations to act in good faith in extending credit
on the card. See note 10 supra and accompanying text. The Arkansas Supreme
Court asserted in Williams that the defendant cardholder's guarantee of payment
was so broad that it necessarily implied that the person extending credit must do so
in good faith. The good faith standard is considerably different from and less
rigorous than the due care requirement imposed in the instant case.
21The court noted that, while the question of the exercise of due care by the
various station attendants was one for the jury, "there were sufficient facts [e.g.,
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admittedly arises not from any contract but from the equities of the situation.22 But, if any duties are to be imposed by operation of law on service
stations, the imposition should result from an examination of the equities
of the credit card phenomenon itself, where-as distinct from bankingthere may not be compelling public interests which require the imposition
of certain duties and prohibit their contractual abrogation. Certainly the
same public policies which are applicable to the savings bank cases do not
apply to the credit card problem where the credit arrangement is ancillary
to a sales objective.2 3 And until the dissimilar considerations which are
applicable to credit cards are examined independently and compelling reasons of public policy found which require modification of the contract, the
expressed intentions of the parties, as set forth in the terms of the contract,
24
should govern the parties' obligations.
the discrepancy between the place of registration of the car (Idaho) and the residence
of the card owner (Oregon)] . . .from which the jury could properly conclude
that further inquiry should have been made." Instant case at 253. But while it may
not be impractical to expect a bank to discharge its burden of due care by inquiring
as to the identity of the payee, the functional differences between a bank and a
service station suggest that reasonable conduct on the part of an attendant would
not include such inquiry. Some of the salient distinctions are: the calibre of the
employees and their tenure; the speed required in service station transactions; the
awareness of both bank employee and bank customer of the need for security; and
the fact that inquiries which, in a bank setting, would seem to be mere security
measures might, in the setting of a service station, evidence a seeming lack of trust
on the part of a company desirous of making a sale.
22
Banks have been required to exercise due care in paying upon the presentation of a passbook even though in the deposit contract they may have disclaimed
responsibility for incorrect payments. E.g., Weigel v. First Nat'l Bank, 20 So. 2d 21
(La. Ct. App. 1944); Connolly v. Manchester Say. Bank, 92 N.H. 89, 25 A.2d 412
(1942) ; Kummel v. Germania Sav. Bank, 127 N.Y. 488, 28 N.E. 398 (1891) ; Fiero v.
Franklin Say. Bank, 124 Misc. 38, 207 N.Y. Supp. 235 (City Ct 1924). In one of
the bank cases cited in the instant case, Ladd v. Augusta Sav. Bank, 96 Me. 510, 52
Atl. 1012 (1902), it was stated that the negligence of the customer is immaterial
because it would not excuse the bank from its duty of due care. If Ladd were
followed in cases where a credit card contained a guarantee provision and both the
issuer and the customer were negligent, defendant customer's negligence would be
immaterial. See Comment, supra note 3, at 484. Contrast with this result the submission to the jury-in the absence of any guarantee provision-of the weighing-ofthe-negligences issue in Gulf Ref. Co. v. Plotnick, 24 Pa. D. & C. 147 (C.P. 1935).
23

"If the bank may negligently . . . pay to [anyone] . . . who has possession

of the bank book, . . . then the depositor has contracted away his right to protection
in any case and the responsibility of the bank for . . . reasonable care, which the
law has imposed for reasons of public policy, is entirely futile." Hough Ave. Say. &
Banking Co. v. Andersson, 78 Ohio St. 341, 346, 85 N.E. 498, 499 (1908). The
courts have recognized the social utility of savings institutions both by protecting
them from excessive duties, Bulakowski v. Philadelphia Say. Fund Soc'y, 270 Pa. 538,
540-41, 113 At. 553, 554 (1921) (dictum), and by protecting the public from paying
too great a price for their services. See Hough Ave. Say. & Banking Co. v.
Andersson, supra. But the social value of the credit card may not be so great
that similar public policy must be invoked to protect the cardholder from a harsh
bargain.
24 It might, in fact, be difficult for the court to become acquainted in trial or
argument with the kind of information which might justify the result it achieved.
Questions such as whether the credit card issuers can bear the loss and whether
they have such control over the individual dealers as to establish and police effectively standards for honoring the cards are more adequately decided with the aid of
legislative resources. And note that in the instant case, such policy considerations
were neither argued before the court nor enunciated in its opinion.
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OF SCHOOL BOARD
MEMBERS WHO MisAPPROPRIATED TAx REvENuES CANNOT BE
SusTAINE IN ABSENCE OF SHOWING THAT TAX=s AS LVIED BY

CRIMINAL LAW-MAiL FRAurD CONVICTIONS
THM WERE ExcEssIVE

Defendants, the dominant figures in a school district,' had implemented
an elaborate scheme to misappropriate a substantial portion of the district's
tax revenues over a period of years.2 The board had a limited taxing
power, and during the life of the scheme the taxes were within the maximum set by statute; 3 however, while legitimate expenditures for district
purposes consistently fell short of receipts, no reserves were established.
Under an indictment which charged that the defendants used the mails
for the purpose of executing a scheme to defraud the state, the district,
and the taxpayers of each, and which enumerated specific instances of the
4
board's use of postal facilities to collect taxes, defendants were convicted
5
of violating the federal mail fraud statute. The Supreme Court reversed
the convictions, holding that use of the mails by public officials pursuant
to a legislative mandate to levy and collect taxes does not constitute a basis
for mail fraud, at least in the absence of an explicit charge that the taxes
were unlawful. 6 Parrv. Utnited States, 363 U.S. 370 (1960).
The federal mail fraud statute 7 was enacted almost a century ago to
protect the public against fraudulent schemes and to prevent the postal
facilities from being used to carry such schemes into effect.3 Most mail
fraud cases present the simple situation wherein defendant deals directly
through the mails with the victims of his fraud.9 But where the connection
1 There were nine individual defendants: three held positions on the four-man
school board; three others worked for the board as secretary, attorney, and assessorcollector; one was president and principal stockholder of two defendant banks; and
two were bank employees. Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 380-81 (1960).
2 The defendants' Texas convictions for embezzlement were not sustained. Parr v.
State, 307 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. Crim. 1957); Donald v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 252, 306
S.W.2d 360 (1957); Chapa v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 554, 301 S.W.2d 127 (1957).
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court assumed for purposes of decision that defendants
fact misappropriated the district's money.
had in
3
Tzx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2784e (1959).
4 The indictment also charged the defendants with misuse of the district's oil
company credit card in the purchase of gasoline for personal purposes; the allegation designed to bring this conduct within the federal statute was that the mails
were used by the oil company to bill the board and by the board to pay the company.
5 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1958). The conviction was affirmed below, 265 F2d 894

(1959).

0 363 U.S. at 391. The Court also held that the use of the mails in the credit card
scheme did not constitute mail fraud inasmuch as the mailing occurred after "fruition"
of the scheme. 363 U.S. at 392-93. See note 4 supra and note 16 infra.
7 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1958). The pertinent part of the statute reads: "Whoever,
having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud . . . for the
purpose of executing such scheme or artifice . . . places . . . or knowingly causes
[mail matter] to be delivered by mail . . . [will be punished]."

s Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 314 (1896).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Holsman, 238 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1956) (defendant
mailed false representations to sell securities) ; Henderson v. United States, 218 F.2d
14 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 920 (1955) (defendant sent misrepresentations to
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between the scheme and the use of the mails is not so obvious, a more
difficult question is presented: how intimate a relationship must exist between the use of the mails and the scheme in order to satisfy the statutory
mandate of use "for the purpose of executing such scheme"? For example,
in Kann v. United States,'0 where defendant had cashed a fraudulent check
at a bank which subsequently mailed it to a clearing house for collection, the
Supreme Court held that, although the defendant had caused the bank's
use of the mail, that use was not for the purpose of executing the schemethe scheme itself had ended."- The Court distinguished its decision in
Kann from those cases in which further frauds may be perpetrated by use
12
Thus, mail
of the mails in order to conceal an earlier fraudulent exploit.
fraud was established where defendant, pursuant to a check-kiting scheme,
deposited in his bank worthless checks drawn on a second account located
elsewhere, hoping to obtain credit on the strength of the deposit while the
checks were clearing; 13 the necessity of the banks use of the mails to collect
the checks meant delay-an essential element of the check-kiting scheme.
In the instant case, the majority, seeming to require allegation and
proof that taxes as assessed and collected exceeded the legitimate needs of
the school district,' 4 concluded in the absence of such allegation and proof
that only the district was defrauded by defendants' scheme; 15 on the other
hand, the dissent took the position that the defendants, through their control
of the district's taxing machinery, had defrauded not only the district but
also the taxpayers.' 6 Because the majority's treatment presupposed a
secure investments) ; Silverman v. United States, 213 F.2d 405 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 828 (1954) (defendant mailed letters inducing victims to pay fictitious
bills); United States v. Whitmore, 97 F. Supp. 733 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (defendant's
false advertising over radio induced victims to mail orders).
10 323 U.S. 88 (1944).
"1323 U.S. at 94.
12-323 U.S. at 94-95. As examples of situations in which further frauds may be
perpetrated, the Court cited United States v. Riedel, 126 F.2d 81 '(7th Cir. 1942)
(issuing false securities through the mails) ; Dunham v. United States, 125 F.2d 895
(5th Cir. 1942) (making false reports to stockholders) ; and United States v. Lowe,
115 F.2d 596 (7th Gir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 717 (1940) (check-kiting). For other
similar cases, see United States v. Earnhardt, 153 F.2d 472 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
328 U.S. 858 (1946) ; Stewart v United States, 300 Fed. 769 (8th Cir. 1924). In
both of these cases, the defrauded victim's fears were allayed by the defrauder's use
of the mails after the fraud had been perpetrated. For cases in which the "further
frauds" theory might have been used but which found instead a continuing scheme
to defraud the public, see Steiner v. United States, 134 F.2d 931 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 319 U.S. 774 (1943); Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941).
18 United States v. Lowe, supra note 12.
14 "[W]e are compelled to say that the indictment did not expressly or impliedly
charge, and there was no evidence tending to show, that the taxes assessed were
excessive, 'padded' or in any way illegal." Instant case at 387. See also the instant
case at 388 where the Court discusses the court of appeals' treatment of the case.
15 "There can be no doubt that the indictment charged and the evidence tended
strongly to show that petitioners devised and practiced a brazen scheme to defraud
by misappropriating, converting and embezzling the District's moneys .
Instant case at 385. (Emphasis added.)
16Instant case at 399-400. On the question of the credit card scheme, see
notes 4 and 6 snepra, the majority and the dissent also differed as to who was
defrauded. The majority indicated that the oil company-not the district-was
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legitimately collected fund from which the defendants embezzled, the fraud
17
The mailing of the tax bills
was divorced from the use of the mails.
of it-the victim's means
a
part
be
to
became too remote from the scheme
embezzlement. Thus the
of
finding
a
to
of obtaining his money is irrelevant
defrauded compels its
was
district
majority's conclusion that only the
of mail fraud is comfinding
decision. On the other hand, the dissent's
"whether they are
defrauded
pelled by their view that the taxpayers were
been deprived of
having
or
viewed as having overpaid for school services,
services for which they paid . ...

18

Thus the scheme becomes a plot

-of which the tax bills are an essential part-to pervert the district's
legitimate tax collecting functions to the purpose of defrauding the taxpayers.
Neither the majority opinion nor that of the dissenting Justices makes
clear what in fact the Court held-that is, whether both the indictment and
the evidence were insufficient to sustain the conviction or whether only the
indictment was faulty. If the latter is the case, prosecution of future similar
cases will not be difficult-all the wise prosecutor need do is include in the
indictment an allegation that the taxes as levied comprised an amount over
and above that which the defendants intended to spend for legitimate school
district purposes. With an explicit charge of "padding" in this sense, the
evidence presented in the instant case-the continuing year-after-year misappropriations combined with a showing of actual misappropriation in the
9
tax year on which the prosecution is based ' -would be sufficient to show
that the defendants fraudulently intended at the time the tax bills were
20
mailed to collect more than they would spend for legitimate purposes.
the victim. Instant case at 393. The dissent found the plot to be one to defraud
the district as a part of a general scheme to defraud the taxpayers thereof. Instant
case at 404. However, it is difficult to justify the majority's view: defendants' actions
were inconsistent with a plot to defraud the oil company inasmuch as they fully
intended that the company would be paid by the district.
17 Compare United States v. Beall, 126 F. Supp. 363 (N.D. Cal. 1954), which
applied Kann to a situation similar to the instant case and held that an embezzler
who worked for a charitable institution was not guilty of mail fraud even though
he embezzled from money mailed by contributors. By holding that the defendant
had embezzled from the charity rather than the contributors, the court was able
to divorce the use of the mails from the fraud. While the opinion of the Court
does not mention Beall, the petitioners stressed its similarity to the instant case.
Brief for Petitioners, pp. 26-27.
15 Instant case at 400. Note that this statement incorporates both of the prosecution's theories as set forth in the majority opinion, instant case at 385-86, and
professes that the results under both would be identical. But compare text accompanying notes 21-22 infra.
"[S]imilar results do not
19 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§302, 304 (3d ed. 1940).
usually occur through abnormal causes; and the recurrence of a similar result . . .
tends

.

.

.

to negative

.

.

. [an] innocent mental state, and tends to establish

. . . the presence of the normal, i.e. criminal, intent accompanying such an

" Id. § 302.
act .
20The defense argued that to affirm defendants'

conviction would make a
federal crime out of every embezzlement scheme where the victim acquired the
embezzled funds by dealing with his debtors through the mails. Brief for Petitioners,
pp. 24-25. The Court neither accepted nor rejected this argument, but it did state
what it considered to be another of the defense's positions. "[P]etitioners' counsel
concede that if . . . a member of a school board . . . improperly 'pads' or increases

the amounts of the statements and causes them to be mailed to bring in a fund to
be looted, such mailings . . . would constitute an essential step 'for the purpose
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Under this theory of prosecution, the magnitude of the actual tax assessment as compared to actual school district needs is irrelevant. But the
Government elected to urge upon the Court the theory that "the taxes were
illegal in that they were assessed, collected and accumulated in excess of the
District'sneeds in order to provide a fund for misappropriation ..
21
Under this theory, both the indictment and the evidence were obviously
insufficient-the former in that it contained no allegation of assessments in
excess of needs, the latter in that no evidence as to actual needs was
introduced. The Government, by adopting the "in excess of needs" theory,
set itself an almost impossible task: it required not only proof of the
abstract "needs" of the district 2 2 but also a showing of a fraudulent disparity between needs and assessments-a showing made even more difficult
than proof of needs by the discretionary nature of the enabling state
statute.2 3 The confused presentation by the Government 24 and the unclarifying treatment by the dissent 2 5 of the two differing theories of prosecution 26 did little to alleviate the majority's failure even to attempt to
2 7
distinguish between the two.
of executing . . . [a] scheme' to defraud in violation of § 1341. They then repeat
and stress their claim that . . . the indictment did not allege . . . that the taxes
assessed and collected were excessive . . . [or] 'padded' . . . ."
Instant case
at 386-87.
21
Instant case at 386. (Emphasis added.)
This theory may have been partially forced upon the Government by the court of appeals' handling of the case
in affirming
the convictions below.
22
To place upon the jury the responsibility to determine what are the needs
of the district-in the way of salaries, new buildings, and other expenditures--is to
open the way for obviously irrational determinations by that body. Furthermore,
such determinations would be extremely difficult for courts to police. Compare
note 2323 infra.
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2784e (1959). At the very least the Government would have to show that the taxing body had abused its discretion by setting
the tax rate at an excessive level as compared to needs. Note the apparently equal
difficulty of a taxpayer attempting to prove that a public taxing body has abused its
discretion in levying taxes. See People ex rel. Thompson v. Chicago & No. W.R.R.,
397 Ill. 266, 73 N.E.2d 418 (1947) ($8,500 levy for expense of $6,500 held not
abuse of discretion); People ex rel. Schaefer v. New York C. & St. L.R.R., 353
Ill. 518, 522, 187 N.E. 443, 445 (1933) (purpose of levy determined from language
used in making it); State ex rel. Johnson v. St. Louis & S.F.R.R., 321 Mo. 35, 10
S.W.2d 918 (1928) (levy must be grossly excessive to be illegal). But see Rogge v.
Petroleum County, 107 Mont. 36, 80 P.2d 380 (1938) (adding to sinking fund
already more than adequate held illegal). Note also that proof of abuse of discretion
may not be enough to prove fraud; but with a past history of misappropriation,
proof of a present abuse of discretion might be enough to sustain the conviction.
24 The Government presented not only the two theories set out in the majority
opinion at 386 but also had a third at the trial level: that the misappropriated moneys
were "needed" by the school district. See instant case at 388.
25 By lumping together the Government's two main arguments and indicating
that the result would be the same under either, see note 18 supra, the dissent failed
either to highlight the difficulties presented by the majority's adoption of the "needs"
analysis or to point out the desirability of the intent-to-defraud-at-the-time-of-billing
theory.
26 Clearly the difficulties presented in attempting to prove needs and abuse of
discretion will lead prosecutors in future similar cases to allege that the defendants
fraudulently intended to misappropriate a portion of whatever amount they ultimately
collected and to attempt to prove this allegation by evidence of similar conduct in
the past.
27Note that the majority, after setting out both of the Government's theories
at 386, proceeds to dismiss the second by silence, failing to mention it in the remainder
of the opinion.
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GOVERNMENT O0NTRACTS-PASING OF TITmE TO MILITARY
VESSELS TO THE GOVERNMENT PURSUANT TO CONTRACT WITH DiFAULTING
MEN'S

SHIPBUILDER

LIENS

AND

DESTROYS

CONSTITUTES

OTHERWISE

VALID

UNCONSTITUTIONAL

MATERIALTAKING

OF

PROPERTY

The Government terminated a shipyard's contract to build navy personnel boats because of the yard's default,' took title to the uncompleted
hulls and other materials, and sent them to other firms for completion. The
shipyard subsequently went bankrupt. Unpaid suppliers brought an action
against the United States claiming that under state law they had been
entitled to materialmen's liens on the boats, 2 that their liens had been
defeated when the boats became government property, and that the Government's action constituted a taking of private property for public use,
entitling them to just compensation. The Court of Claims held that petitioners never possessed valid liens and thus were not entitled to compensation, reasoning that property being built with the intention that title should
eventually vest in the Government is as immune from mechanics' and
8
materialmen's liens as property actually owned by the United States. The4
Supreme Court reversed, holding that petitioners initially had valid liens
but that the liens had been vitiated by the Government's taking of title.
The Court went on to decide that the liens were property within the

meaning of the fifth amendment and that the Government's action constituted a taking of that property for public use.

Armstrong v. United

States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
Two statutory schemes exist by which those who furnish a contractor
with building materials may be protected against the contractor's failure to
pay.

State lien statutes give unpaid materialmen a security interest in the

property being constructed which may be enforced by attachment and
judicial sale in priority to any unsecured creditor. 5 However, a materialman is not protected by these statutes if the property being built belongs to
the federal or state governments, for a lien cannot be foreclosed against
'The clause which gives the Government power to terminate a supply contract
is set forth at 32 C.F.R. § 8.707 (Supp. 1960). The contract clause invoked by the
Government in the instant case is substantially the same. See Armstrong v. United
States, 169 F. Supp. 259, 260 n.2 (Ct Cl. 1959).
2 See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 178, § 13 (1954).
3
Armstrong v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 259 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
4In United States v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 218 U.S. 452 (1910), the
Court held that, inasmuch as a private citizen cannot obtain a lien on public property,
materialmen could not foreclose a lien on a ship being built for the Government under
a contract which provided that the vessel was to become property of the Government
as it was paid for. The Court of Claims relied on the Ansonia decision, but the
Supreme Court distinguished it on the grounds that in the instant case the petitioners'
liens attached before title to the ships ever passed to the United States. The Court
also pointed out that the fifth amendment issue had not been raised by counsel in
Ansonia.
5 PHiLLips,

MEcnANIcs' LIENs ON REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY § 9 (3d ed.

1893). See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 82, §§ 40, 45 (Smith-Hurd 1935); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. ch. 178, §§ 13, 25-30 (1954), as amended, ME.REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 178,

§§ 28, 30 (Supp. 1959) ; N.Y. LiEN LAws §§ 3, 41, 46, 48-50, 85, 86, 88-94.
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public property. 6 On projects where public property is involved, material7
men are protected by compulsory bond statutes such as the Miller Act,
which requires that whoever contracts with the United States to build or
repair a "public building or public work" must execute a penal bond "for the
protection of all persons supplying labor and materials" to the project.8 An
unpaid laborer or materialman may bring an action on the bond in the name
of the United States to recover payment.9 Since the amount of the required
bond is large, 10 the act protects as securely as a lien. But the system of
securing laborers and materialmen by commercial surety bonds rather
than by the property on which the work is being done adds to the
expense of government contracts, makes it more difficult for a small contractor without an established credit rating to undertake government jobs,
and frequently delays the letting of contracts while prospective contractors
try to raise the required bonds." In addition, the term "public work"
has been construed to include many activities 12 which were probably not
contemplated by those who formulated the payment bond system. Fearing
for these reasons that strict statutory compliance might hamper defense
mobilization, Congress permitted waiver of Miller Act bonds,' 3 and such
waiver appears to be standard procedure in all defense contracts except
those for "construction"-that is, the building of roads, bridges, and the
like. 14 Thus, one who deals with a government contractor is frequently
left with no security except that which he might win by negotiation with
the contractor. 15
6 United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 241 (1947); United States
v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 218 U.S. 452, 471 (1910); Equitable Sur. Co. v.
United States ex rel. McMillan, 234 U.S. 448, 455 (1914) (dictum).
749 Stat. 793 (1935), as amended, 40 U.S.C. §§270a-e (1958), as amended, 40
U.S.C. §§270b(b), c (Supp. 1959).
849 Stat. 793 (1935), 40 U.S.C. §270a (1958).
See H.R. REP. No. 1263, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); 79 CONG. REc. 11702 (1935) (remarks of Rep. Miller);
Cushman, Contractors' Bonds on Federal Construction Projects, 41 DIcK. L. REV.
1-3 (1936).
949 Stat. 794 (1935), 40 U.S.C. §270b (1958).
10 The Miller Act requires for contracts under $1,000,000 a bond of 50% of the
amount payable; for contracts between $1,000,000 and $5,000,000, 40%; for contracts
over $5,000,000, a bond of $2,500,000. 49 Stat. 793 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 270a (1958).
11 See 87 CONG. REC. 3049 (1941) (remarks of Senator Thomas with regard to
bill to permit waiver). See also S. REP. No. 165, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1941).
12 See Title Guar. & Trust Co. v. Crane Co., 219 U.S. 24 (1910)
(construction
of vessel) ; 38 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 418 (1936) (alteration and repair of Coast Guard
boats, vessels, and aircraft) ; 87 CONG. REc. 3049 (1941) (remarks of Senator Thomas
theorizing extension of bond requirement to contracts for aircraft, machine guns,
tanks, clothing, neckties, and shoelaces).
13 Act of April 29, 1941, ch. 81, 55 Stat. 147. The current provision is 69 Stat.
83 (1955), 40 U.S.C. §270e (1958).
14 See 32 C.F.R. § 599.104-1 (1954) (Army procurement regulations) ; 32 C.F.R.
§ 1010.104-1 (1960) (Air Force procurement regulations).
15 Cf. 32 C.F.R. § 8.208-1 (Supp. 1960) ; Penne, Legal Renedies of the Governitent Subcontractor,32 So. CAL. L. REv. 1, 2-5 (1958) ; Sass, Subcontractors' Claims
Against the Government, 16 FED. B.J. 232-34 (1956).
After World War II the
United States undertook to settle many of the claims of subcontractors for which, by
strict notions of privity, the United States had no legal responsibility. See Act of
July 1, 1944, ch. 358, 58 Stat 649, 41 U.S.C. §§ 101-25 (1958). This policy of the
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The contractor involved in the instant case had not been required to
furnish a payment bond, and petitioners, therefore, attempted to bring
themselves within the protection of the state materialmen's lien statute,
reasoning that because title to the boats was in the shipyard at the time the
materials were furnished the boats were not public property immune from
liens. While it is clear that legal title to the boats was in the shipyard until
0
the contractor defaulted and the Government terminated the contract,' the
Court of Claims said that since the contract provided for the ultimate
transfer of the boats to the United States, that constituted an "inchoate
title" sufficient to confer immunity on the boats during the process of
construction.17 The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that "the
sovereign's immunity against materialmen's liens has never been extended
beyond property actually owned by it." i8 But since the time when
mechanics' and materialmen's statutes were first enacted, 19 the leading
cases 20 have founded the exception in favor of public property not on
metaphysical notions of sovereign immunity and title but on eminently
practical grounds: a lien must be considered in terms of its remedy, a
judicial sale to satisfy the unpaid creditor. Obvious considerations
of public welfare and safety demand that property such as public school
buildings, post offices, and military reservations be protected from such
disposition. Thus, a court which is going to decide the extent of the
exception should look not to the locus of title but rather to whether the
reason for the rule of immunity extends to the case under consideration. If
petitioners had attempted to foreclose their putative liens on these boats,
could the United States have barred the proceedings by injunction? Or
suppose, instead of prosaic personnel boats, these had been top-secret
strategic vessels; could they have been knocked down to the highest bidder
by the sheriff in East Boothbay, Maine? If a judicial sale of the boats
in this case could have been prevented by the United States, then petitioners did not have liens in any legally meaningful sense of the word. The
Government toward many of its contracts may have led many who deal with government contractors to believe that the United States is obliged to pay their claims if
the prime contractor does not. See Everberg, Rights of Contractors and Subcontractors of War Goods, 57 Com. L.J. 313, 314 (1952). Further, although the Government has waived its immunity to suits on contracts "express or implied," 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491 (1958), this does not permit an action against the United States in quasicontract. E.g., Alabama v. United States, 282 U.S. 502 (1931); Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 287 (1928); United States v. Minnesota Mut.
Inv. Co., 271 U.S. 212 (1926). That a materialman or subcontractor expects to be
paid by the Government does not create an implied-in-fact contract that he will be.
H. Herfurth, Jr., Inc. v. United States, 89 Ct. Cl. 122 (1939)..
16 Instant case at 43-44.
1l Armstrong v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 259, 263 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
18Instant case at 42.
19 The history of these statutes in the United States is traced in PILrn's, op.
cit. supra note 5, §§ 6-7.
20 See Foster & Co. v. Fowler & Co., 60 Pa. 27 (1868); Phillips v. Rector &
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 97 Va. 472, 34 S.E. 66 (1899); Moss Iron Works v.
County Court, 89 W. Va. 367, 109 S.E. 343 (1921).
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Court, however, did not decide the original existence of petitioners' liens
in this manner. The Court-and the dissenters did not challenge the
majority on this point-rested its holding on the technical ground that
title to the property had not vested in2 1the United States when petitioners
furnished materials to the contractor.
Having established that they originally held liens on the boats and
materials, petitioners next contended that their liens were property which
the Government by its action had taken, thus entitling them to just compensation. While it is well established that a lien is property protected
by the fifth amendment, 22 it is not so clear that the extinguishment of petitioners' liens was a "taking" within the purview of that constitutional
language. Although one of the purposes of the just compensation clause
is to lift the burdens of government activity from the shoulders of those
on whom such burdens have fallen fortuitously,23 the Government has
not-nor is it required by the Constitution to do so--absorbed all of the
24
In
losses which its activities in fact might cause to private individuals.
deciding which losses the Government must compensate, the Supreme
Court has drawn the line strictly on the basis of the constitutional language:
when the Government inflicts injury upon a claimant's property without
having "taken" it, the loss must lie where it falls regardless of the injury
25
But while this constructo the claimant or the advantage to the public.
tion has been well developed in cases dealing with injuries to tangible
property in which the claimant has an estate, 26 or with regulatory restric21
The instant case is made additionally surprising by the fact that the Chief
Justice, and Justices Black and Douglas, who voted with the majority, have questioned the utility of such concepts as "title" in analyzing cases involving immunity
of federal property to state taxes. See City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S.
489 (1958) ; Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110, 126-27 (1954) (dissenting
opinion).
22
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935); Thibodo
v. United States, 187 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1951). But see 1 JoNEs, LIENs § 10 (3d ed.
1914) ; PHILIPs, op. cit. supra note 5, § 9. Concerning the breadth of the notion
of "property" under the fifth amendment, see United States v. General Motors Corp.,
323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945).
23
See, e.g., United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945).
An earlier view, before the development of "substantive due process," is that the just
compensation clause is an important protection against irresponsible legislation. See
3 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 681 (1833).
24
Ithas been asserted that it would be both proper and feasible for the Govern-

ment to make compensation on such a broad scale. See ScHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATVE LAW AND THE COMMON-LAW WORLD 302-05 (1954).
25

E.g., United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945);
see Bothwell v. United States, 254 U.S. 231 (1920). Compare Portsmouth Harbor
Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922), with Peabody v. United
States, 231 U.S. 530 (1913). Compare Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States,
261 U.S. 502 (1923), with Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U.S. 106
(1924). Compare Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325 (1905), with Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). A resort to verbalisms to determine at
what point to cut off liability perhaps suggests that the reason liability must be cut
off at all is because of some limitation in the judicial process rather than because of
any rational policy about the proper relation between the Government and the
individual.
26
"Property is taken in the constitutional sense when inroads are made upon
an owner's use of it to an extent that, as between private parties, a servitude has
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tions upon the uses of property by its owner, 27 what the Government must
do to "take" a security interest is not much litigated. As a general rule
property can be "taken" in the constitutional sense without the actual
acquisition and exercise by the Government of the interest of which the
claimant is deprived.28 Thus, where congressional legislation directly and
purposely impairs the security of mortgage liens, it has been held that the
lienors' property is thereby "taken" even though the Government does not
itself acquire any security interest in the mortgaged land.29 Nor is it
requisite that the Government act directly upon a lien in order to take it.
Where the property to which a lien has attached is itself taken-for
example, by the power of eminent domain-the lienor is entitled to compensation.3 0 But the instant case goes a step further: the property to which
been acquired by agreement or in course of time." United States v. Dickinson, 331
U.S. 745, 748 (1947). See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946);
United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256 (1939); Richards v. Washington
Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914); cf. Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271
(1939). Compare Peabody v. United States, 231 U.S. 530 (1913), with Portsmouth
Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922). A parallel question-how to measure just compensation once it is determined that some property
has been taken-is sometimes treated as a "taking" question. See Mitchell v. United
States, 267 U.S. 341 (1925); Campbell v. United States, 266 U.S. 368 (1924);
Bothwell v. United States, 254 U.S. 231 (1920). The position that property is taken
when the owner's enjoyment of the palpable object has been substantially impaired,
see, e.g., United States v. Causby, supra, departs from a purely physical notion of
property. Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 YALE L.J.
221, 231 (1931). Such a departure is a prerequisite to holding, as in the instant case,
that 27
a lien is property subject to being taken.
See note 33 infra.
28 United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945); United
States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 470 (1903); Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United States,
148 U.S. 312, 343 (1893); cf. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166
(1871) (Wisconsin constitutional language identical to that of fifth amendment). But
see United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 155 (1952). However,
in two cases where the injuries to claimants are identical, whether the United States
succeeds to the claimant's interest may be determinative of whether there is a taking.
Cf. Bothwell v. United States, 254 U.S. 231 (1920). Thus, where the United States
requisitioned the output of a steel manufacturer, thereby depriving plaintiff of profits
under a favorable contract to buy steel from the manufacturer, it was held that the
contract (which is property) was not taken by the Government. Omnia Commercial
Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923). But, where the United States requisitioned a particular hull, ordered the shipbuilder to continue construction as under
the original contract with a private buyer, and took credit for the initial payment
which the buyer had made, it was held that the United States had taken buyer's
contract, just compensation for which would be the value of an assignment of buyer's
rights at the time of the taking, thus allowing for the enhancement of the contract's
value during wartime inflation. Brooks Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U.S.
106 (1924).
29 Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
In that
case legislation designed to relieve depression-stricken farmers was held unconstitutional. A subsequent statute was sustained which, although it impaired the speed
with which the mortgage lienor might enforce his right, did not weaken the security
which the lien provided. Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300

U.S. 30440 (1937).

Thibodo v. United States, 187 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1951). The lien must have
attached before the United States takes the land. A bondholder who would have
been entitled to a lien on real property contiguous to the improvement being financed
by the bonds, had the property been reassessed while it remained in private hands,
was not entitled to compensation when the Government's taking of the property by
eminent domain frustrated a subsequent attempt to reassess the property. Mullen
Benevolent Corp. v. United States, 290 U.S. 89 (1933).
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petitioners' lien was attached-the boats and materials-was not itself
"taken" in the constitutional sense. The Government acquired the boats
by the exercise not of a governmental power but rather of a contractual
right for which it had bargained. And the application of the physical
concept of taking to such an abstraction as a security interest is manifestly
inapposite. 3 1 The Court stated that "the total destruction by the Government of all value of these liens . . . has every possible element of a
Fifth Amendment 'taking' ...
.8
,"
But the only elements which the
Court enumerated were the claimants' great damage and the Government's
advantage in the vitiation of the liens.33 The word "taken" is inherently
ambiguous; a court faced with its application must decide whether the
policy it believes to inhere in the fifth amendment calls for compensation. As between the Government and the petitioners, someone must
sustain a loss without fault because of the prime contractor's financial
collapse. Even though the result of the instant case might be regarded as
eminently fair, the reasoning behind that result is unsatisfying: by its failure to articulate the premises on which the decision is based, the Court
offers no guidance for future cases which are similar but not identical. For
example, the decision fails to indicate whether the Government will be
obliged to compensate lienors when it acquires title to property through
delivery at the completion of the contract rather than through exercising
its termination rights under the contract. Should the Court hold that a
lien is taken when the Government invokes extraordinary powers under
31 See generally Cormack, supra note 26.
32

Instant case at 48.

33 In its opinion the Court apparently treats as an equivalent what has usually

been considered a one-way implication. To say that it is a precondition to finding
a "taking" that the claimant's property interest be damaged and the Government be
benefited is not the same thing as saying that there is necessarily a taking when a
claimant's property is damaged and the Government reaps some benefit therefrom.
Such a rule would require the Government to compensate everyone who sustains
economic injury from the operation of a general regulatory statute and clearly that
is not the law. E.g., West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662 (1935) ;
Dayton-G.C. Ry. v. United States, 263 U.S. 456 (1924); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S.
135 (1921); Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264 (1920); The Pipe Line Cases,
234 U.S. 548 (1914); The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
After it is established that the Government has reaped sone benefit at the expense
of a claimant's property interest, other factors usually determine whether claimant's
property has been taken or merely consequentially injured. The proximity of the
government activity to the injurious effect is one such factor. E.g., United States v.
Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945) ; United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316
(1917) ; Jackson v. United States, 230 U.S. 1 (1913).
But see United States v.
Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950) (5-to-4 decision). This test has
only metaphorical utility in deciding a case like the instant one. The nature of the
power being exercised and the circumstances calling for its use frequently affects
whether an injury to property will be regarded as a "taling." Compare Louisville
& N.R.R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911), and Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325
(1905), with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
Compare
United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952), with United States
v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951), and United States v. Central Eureka
Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
See Fitts & Marquis, Liability of the Federal
Government and its Agents for Injuries to Real Property Resulting From River
Improvements, 16 TENN. L. REv. 801 (1941) ; 18 U. CmS. L. REv. 355 (1951).
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its contract to acquire title to the property to which the lien is attached,
but not when that title vests in the Government by the normal acts of payment and delivery, the distinction in terms of "taking" can lie only in some
tenuous finding of "intent" on the part of the alleged taker.3 4
The irony of the instant case, as pointed out by the dissent, is that it
is because the sovereign's property is immune to liens in the first place that
petitioners' liens were said to have been taken at all. 35 Does the decision
"effectively negative" this immunity, as the dissent asserted? General
principles of sovereign immunity 3 6 aside, the reason for excepting public
34
When the Government forces a contractor to convey to it because of the
contractor's default, as in the instant case, the Government should have reason to
know that there may be unpaid materialmen entitled to liens which will be nullified
by the vesting of the property in the United States. When the Government takes
title by delivery of the completed article from a contractor who has not defaulted,
there is less reason for the Government to suppose that it is destroying anyone's lien.
Since in either case the Government receives title by rights purchased under the
contract, the distinction, for purposes of defining "taking," would seem to turn on
what the Government had reason to know when it took title to the lien-encumbered
property. Some early cases injected such a mental element into the definition of
"taking." See Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341 (1925); Klebe v. United
States, 263 U.S. 188 (1923); John Horstman Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 138
(1921); Tempel v. United States, 248 U.S. 121 (1918); Peabody v. United States,
231 U.S. 530, 539 (1913) (dictum); Lenhoff, Development of the Concept of Eminent
Domain, 42 COLum. L. REv. 596, 609 (1942); Developments in the Law-Remedies
Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 HARv. L. REv. 827, 875-81 (1957).
These decisions were based upon an interpretation of the Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24
Stat. 505 (1887), the current version of which confers jurisdiction upon the Court
of Claims "to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded
either upon the Constitution, or . . .upon any express or implied contract with the
United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in
tort" 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1958). That interpretation was that the United States had
waived its consent to be sued only in cases founded on express or implied contracts.
John Horstman Co. v. United States, supra; Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S.
163 (1894); accord, Camp Far West Irr. Dist. v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 908
C. 1946). Since "implied" contracts is read to mean those implied in fact, not
,(Ct.
quasi-contracts,"
cases cited note 15 mpra, the result is that when the Government
takes private property, there must be a factual basis for implying a promise to pay
for it, before compensation can be given. Compare United States v. Buffalo Pitts
Co., 234 U.S. 228 (1914), with Ball Eng'r Co. v. J. G. White & Co., 250 U.S. 46
(1919). The presumption that the Government intends to pay for what the Con-

stitution says it should, United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903), United States
v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U.S. 645 (1884), makes this implication easy in most
cases. But in cases in which the government agents did not concede the claimant's
proprietary right, Klebe v. United States, supra, Tempel v. United States, supra,
or in which the damage done to the claimants property was unintended and reasonably
unknown at the time the injurious activity was conducted, Mitchell v. United States,
supra, John Horstman Co. v. United States, supra, it was held that no factual
promise could be implied on the part of the United States to make compensation.
It seems unfair that the mental attitude of a government agent should determine
whether a citizen whose property has been demonstrably appropriated has a right to
compensation. These cases, which purport to go only to the jurisdiction of the
Court of Claims, are poor authority for what constitutes a taking under the fifth
amendment. And even on the precise issue of jurisdiction, their viability seems
questionable. See United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947); United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267 (1946); United States v. Lynah, sulra at 474
(concurring opinion); Cotton Land Co. v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 232 (Ct. Cl.
1948) ; Note, 70 HAv. L. REv. 827, 879 (1957) ; cf. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S.
13, 16 (1933) ; Phelps v. United States, 274 U.S. 341, 343 (1927).
35 See instant case at 50.
36 See Setser, The Immunity of the State and Government Economic Activities,
24 LAw & CONTEMT. PROB. 291, 293-94 (1959).
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property from private liens is the prevention of the public injury which would
result should the liens be foreclosed. 37 But the instant case concludes that
petitioners do not have any rights in rem against government propertythose were "taken." 3 8 In exchange, the Constitution gives them a right, in
personam, against the United States, to just compensation. The procedure
whereby that right may be enforced-a lawsuit in the Court of Claimsdoes not threaten to disrupt government activity as would the subjection of
specific government property to execution under the lien statutes.
Except where claims are large enough and claimants can afford the
relatively slow procedure of a lawsuit against the Government, the present
decision may not offer much practical protection to materialmen and
laborers who remain unsatisfied by government contractors. It may,
however, affect government contracting practices as the United States
tries, by various alternatives, to avoid its implications. The opinion of the
Court, carefully pointing out that title to the boats was in the shipyard, suggests that mere words in government contracts-providing that all supplies
are to be bought by the contractor as agent for the United States and that title
to them is to vest immediately in the Government--can prevent materialmen from acquiring liens in the first place. Whether the Government will
want to employ this expedient is another question, for matters other than
the creation of materialmen's liens may hinge on technical questions of
title.3 9 Another alternative is for the Government to withhold from its
prime contractors a greater percentage of payment until it is assured that the
job has been finished and the property delivered unencumbered. In the
event of default, the Government would retain a sufficient reserve to offset
losses resulting from the claims of unsatisfied materialmen and laborers.
This device might adequately protect the Government, but it would have
a pernicious effect on government procurement practices. Carried to an
extreme which would insure the Government effective protection,40 it would
mean that only the richest companies could afford to do business with the
Government on major projects.41 A company contracting on such a basis
would be forced to make a sizeable investment before it would receive any
appreciable return on its contract; or it would be required to borrow large
sums for longer terms to overcome lean days at the commencement of any
37

See text accompanying note 20 supra; cf. Setser, upra note 36, at 302, 308.

38 See United States v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 218 U.S. 452 (1910).

39
E.g., liability to various state taxes. Compare Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock,
347 U.S. 110 (1954), with City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489 (1958).
40 The Government withheld 3% from all progress payments made to the prime
contractor in the instant case. Armstrong v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 259, 260
(Ct. Cl. 1959). The prime contractor's default increased the cost of the boats to
the Government by 64% over the original contract price. This increased figure does
not include the petitioners' claims. See instant case at 45.
41 This would run counter to Congress' express policy to place more government
procurement business with small companies. See Senate Select Comm. on Small
Business, Small Business Participation in Government Procurement, S. REP. No.
2827, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1956). See also id. at 3: "[I]n spite of congressional
efforts to foster wide small-business participation in Government procurement, the
trend seems to be in the opposite direction."
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government job. And the costs of carrying such loans would inevitably be
reflected in bids for such contracts. It is questionable whether the Government would economize by trying to protect itself in this way-unless
government contractors very frequently fail to perform their contracts and
pay their materialmen.

INSURANCE-FTC Jur IsDimCio

NOT PRECLUDED BY STATE
ATTEMPT To REGULATE DoMICiimRY IxsuRER's EXTRATERR0iTOIAL
TRADE PRICEms
Mail-order insurance company, incorporated in and a domiciliary of
Nebraska, was licensed to do business there and in Virginia only. Although
the company had no agents or offices outside Nebraska, it sold policies
throughout the nation, soliciting business by mailing letters to prospective
buyers recommended by existing policyholders. Pursuant to a finding that
certain statements and representations contained in the company's circulars were misleading and deceptive, the Federal Trade Commission issued
a cease and desist order. On appeal, insurer argued that the FTC had no
jurisdiction to issue the order inasmuch as the McCarran-Ferguson Act
(Insurance) 1 limits FTC jurisdiction over insurance companies to cases
where such business is not regulated by state law; 2 here, Nebraska had
provided by statute that no domiciliary of that state should engage in unfair
or deceptive acts in Nebraska or elsewhere.3 The Eighth Circuit agreed
and set aside the order for want of jurisdiction. 4 The Supreme Court,
reversing, held that Nebraska's attempted regulation of its domiciliary's
extraterritorial activities was not the type of regulation whose operation was
intended by Congress to preclude FTC jurisdiction. The case was remanded for determination of whether FTC jurisdiction is negatived by the
regulation of states which receive the advertising. FTC v. Travelers
Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293 (1960).
The McCarran-Ferguson Act was a reaction to the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn,5 which
overthrew the precedents of seventy-five years I and declared insurance
to be within the purview of the commerce clause and subject, in its interstate aspects, to federal regulation. The act was intended to restore to
42 See generally Cushman, Contractors' Bonds on Federal Construction Projects,
41 DicK. L. REv. 1, 18-25 (1936).

159 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1958).
2 59 Stat 34 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1958).
3

NEB. R.Ev. STAT. §44-1503 (Supp. 1957).
4 Travelers Health Ass'n v. FTC, 262 F.2d 241 (8th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 362 U.S.

293 (1960).
5322
U.S. 533 (1944).
6

Begining with Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
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the states the power to regulate and tax the business of insurance. 7 Under
the act the Court held, in FTC v. National Cas. Co., s that state laws regulating the advertising of insurance companies licensed to do business within
that state prevent regulation by the FTC where the advertising is distributed by local agents. The instant case distinguished National9 ) and
relied instead on the legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.' 0
The insurer's additional argument-that the FTC lacked jurisdiction because the advertising practices are also controlled by the states which
received the circulars 1-was left unanswered by the Court on the ground
that it had not been considered below. The resulting narrowness of the
holding raises a doubt as to the meaningfulness of the FTC's "victory."
While the decision adds to the necessary delineation of the appropriate
sphere of state regulation, it is likely to prove more significant in directing
consideration of the question it left undecided.
An obvious and logical consideration in determining whether state
regulation is sufficient under the McCarran-Ferguson Act to preclude federal action is the effectiveness of that regulation. Although the Court
does not discuss this consideration, any preference for control by the state
of destination must be based, at least to some degree, on the fact that the
more desirable regulation would be that enunciated and enforced by the
representatives of those likely to be injured by fraudulent advertising. 12
Interests of local citizens can be asserted not only at the legislative level,
where the choice as to the structure of the regulatory scheme is made, but
also through an enforcement agency which would certainly be more
responsive to the complaints of residents than would a similar agency in
the insurer's domicile. While such regulation burdens the insurer by
forcing him to appear before the regulatory agencies of the insured's state,
the Court has declared that such inconvenience does not amount to a denial
of due process.' 3 It is clear that the alternative of requiring the insured
to travel to the insurer's state in order to press a complaint would prove at
least as onerous. While a state may, of course, elect as a legislative policy
to rely upon the protection afforded by the insurer's state, such an abdica7 "Congress declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several
States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the
part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation
or taxation of such business by the several States." 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1958). In Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946),

which established the constitutionality of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the Court
said: "Obviously Congress' purpose was broadly to give support to the existing and
future state systems for regulating and taxing the business of insurance." Id. at 429.
8357 U.S. 560 (1958) (per curiam).
9 In National the insurers were licensed by, and had agents in, the regulating
states. These agents were engaged in the distribution of the insurer's advertising.
See instant case at 297.

'l Instant case at 299-302.

11 See Brief for Respondent, pp. 25-28.
12 This consideration was expressed by judge Vogel in his dissent to the decision
in the instant case below, 262 F.2d 241, 245 (8th Cir. 1959).
-1 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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tion of affirmative regulation would not avoid FTC jurisdiction, for to
force the insured to rely solely on that protection is, in the words of the
dissenting judge below, "impractical and ineffective."' 14 But if FTC
regulation is to be precluded by affirmative actions of the insured's state
when not precluded by the controls exercised by the company's domicile,
the distinction must lie in the supposed greater effectiveness of the more
convenient, consumer-oriented regulation.' 5 And whether that effectiveness exists in fact depends upon the nature of the regulation obtaining
in the insured's state.
In the wake of McCarran-Ferguson and with the encouragement of
Congress,' states placed on their statute books a number of laws modeled
after the federal acts they were designed to preclude. At present, all fifty
states and Puerto Rico have adopted the Fair Trade Practices Act or its
equivalent,' 7 defining those acts which constitute unfair methods of competition.' 8 Statutes of this nature were the ones found to be sufficient
to oust FTC regulation in National. However, these statutes contain no
explicit provision for reaching the unauthorized' 9 foreign insurer,20 a
'A 262 F.2d at 245.

15 As to the effective enforcement of state regulation-as opposed to the existence
of a legislative scheme which, if enforced, would be effective, see Layne, Multiple
State Regulation of Mail OrderInsurance,39 GEo. LJ. 422, 435-36 (1951) ; McCarter,
Recent Misleading and Deceptive Mail-Order Accident and Health Insurance Policies
and Advertising, 1956 INs. LJ.247, 256-60; Note, Reaching the Out-of-State MailOrder Invurer, 64 HARv. L. Rxv. 482 (1951); Note, Regulation of Inmirance Advertising Practices: A JurisdictionalInquiry, 67 YALE L.J. 452 (1958). The FTC
has contended that it is not precluded by state action unless that state action is in
fact effective. Instant case at 298 n.4; FTC v. National Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560,
563-64 (1958) (per curiam). The Court has indicated that it would not look into the
effectiveness of state regulation absent a charge that the regulation was a sham. Id.
at 564-65.
16The McCarran-Ferguson Act provided for the suspension of certain federal
laws for a three-year period during which time it was expected that the states would
enact laws designed to preclude the application of the similar federal statute. 59
Stat. 34 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1013(a) (1958). The purpose of the moratorium was made explicit during the Senate debate on the bill. See 91 CoNG. Rxc.

1442-44 (1945).

17 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INsURANcE COMMISSIONERS
[hereinafter cited as NAIC PROCMINGS]. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE
§§790-.09; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§72-15-1 to 15-13 (1953); Mo. STAT. ANN.
§§375.930-.948 (Supp. 1959); N.Y. INs. LAW §§270-82; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§§ 1151-62 (1954), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1152 (Supp. 1959).
IsE.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1151 (1954).
19 "Unauthorized" as used in this context denotes merely that the insurer is

150 (1960)

not licensed by the state in which it is soliciting business. In such cases the sanction of withdrawal of the license is, of course, unavailable to the would-be regulating
state.
20 In the Brief for the Health Insurance Ass'n of America as Amicus Curiae,
pp. 17-23, App. A, it is argued on rehearing that the Fair Trade Practices Acts of
the various states apply to respondent. While none of the acts are explicitly addressed
toward unauthorized insurers, some of them do provide for service by mail; in all
other states, a separate provision for service by mail exists which, if construed with
the Fair Trade Practices Act, might be viewed as providing a comprehensive system
of regulation. It is conceivable that, in view of the Supreme Coures recognition of
the congressional policy to leave insurance regulation to the states, these provisions
might be interpreted as sufficient to place unauthorized insurers solely under state
control. But it is significant, first, that the Fair Trade Practices Acts make no
provision for the use of a state official as agent for service on the insurer; such a
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problem not raised by National where the insurers were licensed and had
agents within the regulating states. This jurisdictional problem is the key
21
to effective state regulation.
Supplemental legislation aimed directly at the jurisdictional problem
has been proposed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 2 2 and adopted by North Dakota 23 and Nevada. 24 The Unauthorized Insurers False Advertising Process Act provides that any of a number
of transactions connected with the business of insurance shall constitute
the appointment of the state insurance commissioner as the insurer's attorney for the service of process. 25 In Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex
provision is a common technique in laws attempting to deal with nonresidents, such
as nonresident motorist statutes, the Unauthorized Insurers Process Act, see note 32
infra, and the Unauthorized Insurers False Advertising Process Act, see notes 22-25
infra and accompanying text. Second, one of the earliest formulations of the Fair
Trade Practices Act contained-an express provision exempting alien insurers from
the authority of the insurance commissioner except that he was to notify the commissioner of the state of the insurer's domicile as to the insurer's unfair practices.
NAIC PROCEEIaNGS 234 (1947). While this provision was deleted, at no time does
it appear from the records of the NAIC-the moving force in the enactment of this
legislation-that the act was seen as extending to the regulation of the unauthorized,
alien insurer. Third, both before and after its formulation, the NAIC was concerned
with the problem of how to control the unauthorized mail-order insurer. As early
as 1941, NAIC PROCEEDNGS 146-48 (1941), it was urged that states adopt laws
forbidding domiciliaries from insuring in states in which they were not licensed. See
note 21 infra. This plea was renewed in 1948. NAIC PROCEEDINGS 471-72 (1948).
In 1951 when the Fair Trade Practices Act had already been adopted by many states,
the Unauthorized Insurers False Advertising Process Act was presented to the
association, NAIC PROCEEDINGS 169-71 (1951), implying that the association did not
regard the Fair Trade Practices Act alone as sufficient. The implication was made
explicit in 1959 when the report to the association stated that "no remedy is accorded
the Insurance Commissioners against unauthorized insurers either to exact a penalty,
or to issue cease and desist orders under the provisions of the insurance laws." The
report then goes on to recommend the passage of the Unauthorized Insurers False
Advertising Process Act which, it states, in conjunction with the Fair Trade Practices Act, provides a method by which a state may proceed against an unauthorized
insurer. 1 NAIC PRocEEDINGs 151, 154-55 (1959); see 2 NAIC PROCEEDINGS 517
(1959).
21
Almost half the states have adopted a type of statute which represents a
*special effort to deal with the unauthorized insurer in its state of domicile. It forbids
a domestic insurer to sell or offer for sale insurance in a foreign state unless the
insurer is authorized by that state. Inasmuch as this legislation attempts to control
the extraterritorial activities of domestic insurers, as did the Nebraska regulation
involved in the instant case, it would probably not preclude FTC action against the
same activities. Some of these laws extend the prohibition only to states which have
a reciprocal law. E.g., Ky. R v. STAT. § 304.585 (1959); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§402:54 (1955); WASH. REV. CODE § 48.07.150 (1951). States with similar provisions are California, Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, North Dakota, Virginia, and the
Territory of Puerto Rico. Others extend it to all states. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 41-109 (1947); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 40-214 (Supp. 1959); On'o REv. CODE
ANN. § 3905.44 (Page 1953). States with similar provisions are Colorado, Maryland,
Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, South Dakota, and Utah. For
a brief discussion of an informal means of state regulation, see 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 156,
159 n.27 (1959).
22NAIC PROCEEDINGS 169-71 (1951). For the present formulation of the act,
see 12 NAIC PROCEEDINGS 151-52 (1960).
3 N.D. REv. CODE §§ 26-09A01 to -09A07 (Supp. 1957).
2
4 NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 686.480-.500 (1959).
25 N.D. Rv. CODE § 26-09A04 (1959) provides: "Any of the following acts in
this state, effected by mail or otherwise, by any unauthorized foreign or alien insurer:
1. The issuance or delivery of contracts of insurance to residents of this state or to
corporations authorized to do business therein, 2. The collection of premiums for
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rel. State Corp. Comn'n,20 appellant, the same firm as in the instant case
and operating in the same manner except that it was not at that time
licensed by Virginia, was subjected to a cease and desist order after receiving notice of the proceedings against it by registered mail as provided by
Virginia's Blue Sky Law.27 The Court rejected the insurer's contention
that the enforcement of the cease and desist order would violate due
process,2 8 finding that the company's systematic solicitation and widespread
membership in the state2 9 provided contacts sufficient to make its subjection
to the order consistent with "fair play and substantial justice." 30 The
decision in Travelers v. Virginia indicates the constitutional validity, and
thus the probable effectiveness to preclude federal regulation, of such of the
Fair Trade Practices Acts as make provision for service by mail-even
without resort to the Unauthorized Insurers False Advertising Process
Act. But the Fair Trade Practices Acts make no mention of unauthorized
insurers and, while state construction of those acts so as to include such
such contracts, or 3. Any other transaction of business, is equivalent to and shall
constitute an appointment by such insurer of the commissioner . . . [as his attorney
for service of] all statements of charges, notices and lawful process in any proceeding
instituted in respect to the misrepresentations . . . [of the insurer's advertising]."
Section 5 of the act as proposed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, and as adopted in Nevada, NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 686.230, .480-.500 (1959),
explicitly provides that the solicitation of applications for insurance contracts
will be sufficient to constitute the appointment of the commissioner as attorney for
the service of process. Initial proceedings whereby the supervisory official of the
insurer's domiciliary is given notice of the insurer's practices are provided for under
this act. If after thirty days the commissioner feels that further measures are in
order, he is to proceed under the Fair Trade Practices Act. Unauthorized Insurers
False Advertising Process Act § 4 (1960).
26 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
2
7 Va. Acts 1932, ch. 236, § 6, at 434.
28The appellant's contention that Virginia had no power to reach it was
largely based on Minnesota Ass'n v. Benn, 261 U.S. 140 (1923), which held that a
Minnesota mail-order insurer could not be sued in Montana courts unless consent to
Montana suits could be implied, and that the transactions in that case were insufficient
to support the implication. In rejecting this contention, the Court stated: "but where
business activities reach out beyond one state and create continuing relationships and
obligations with citizens of another state, courts need not resort to a fictional 'consent'
in order to sustain the jurisdiction of regulatory agencies in the latter state. And
in considering what constitutes 'doing business' sufficiently to justify regulation in the
state where the effects of the 'business' are felt, the narrow grounds relied on by the
Court in the Bern case cannot be deemed controlling." 339 U.S. at 647.
29 Travelers had, at that time, approxinately 800 policyholders in Virginia. 339
U.S. 3 at 646.
OMr. Justice Douglas, who provided the fifth vote of the five-man majority,
stressed in a separate concurring opinion the use of existing policyholders as quasiagents as his reason for concurring. He made clear that in his opinion "a state is
helpless when the out-of-state company operates beyond the borders, establishes no
office in the state, and has no agents, salesmen, or solicitors to obtain business for
it within the state." 339 U.S. at 653-54. If these policyholders were, in fact, agents,
they would -be subject to VA. CoDE ANN. § 13.1-507 (1956) (Blue Sky Law), which
requires them to be registered. Many states have similar provisions regarding insurance agents and a conviction under such a provision was upheld in Robertson v.
California, 328 U.S. 440 (1946). However, no action was taken against the policyholders on this basis, and although Mr. Justice Douglas insisted that the use of the
policyholders as agents was essential to the decision that appellant could be reached
by the state, service was not made on any such quasi-agent. The significance of
this distinction has been much weakened, if not totally destroyed, by McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), see text accompanying note 13 supra.
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insurers within their provisions is possible, it would appear from the
expressed concern of the state insurance commissioners as to the inadequacy
of the acts in this regard that such a construction would be strained and
unlikely. 31 By contrast, the Unauthorized Insurers False Advertising
Process Act's explicit treatment of this problem represents the most
promising means within the framework of state regulation to curb the
fraudulent practices of unauthorized mail-order insurers. This act would
preclude the exercise of FTC authority in those states which enact it, an
effect which should provide considerable incentive for urging its adoption
to those who are eager to preserve state control over the insurance business.
The validity of such an exercise of legislative jurisdiction over unauthorized insurers can be readily established. Since Travelers v. Virginia,
the Court has further expanded the area in which state process may be
employed with regard to foreign corporations. The individual citizen injured in his contractual relations with an unauthorized insurer can now call
it to answer in the insured's state.32 The Supreme Court has made it clear
that states have "a manifest interest in providing effective means of redress
for [their] residents" 33 in connection with disputes over insurance contracts.3 4 While the jurisdiction there spoken of is judicial rather than
legislative, it is difficult to find any justification for permitting citizens a
practical means of redress while forbidding state action aimed at the
prevention of the very difficulties which require redress 3 5 Such a result
31 See note 20 .mpra.

32 Valid service can be made under the Unauthorized Insurers Process Act which
has been enacted by at least forty-three states. 1 NAIC PROCEEDINGS 173 (1959).
E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 28, §§ 412-17 (1958) ; CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1610-20; Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 375.160-.169 (1951); N.Y. INS. LAws § 59-a; PA. STAT. ANN. tit 40, §§ 1005.1-.6
(1954). This act provides that the issuance of a contract of insurance, solicitation for
such contracts, collection of premiums, or any other transaction of insurance business
will constitute the appointment by the insurer of the insurance commissioner as his
attorney for service of process in any action on behalf of an insured arising from such a
contract of insurance. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957),
established
the constitutionality of this act.
3
3Id. at 223.
34 In recent years there has been a general expansion of the reach of state
authority. With regard to criminal extradition, see In re Cooper, 53 Cal. 2d 776,
349 P.2d 956, appeal dismissed mib nor. Cooper v. Pritchess, 29 U.S.L. WEEK 3110
(U.S. Oct 18, 1960) (extradition upheld where petitioners had never been present
in the demanding state). In the area of the vulnerability of foreign corporations
to state taxation, see Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960) (independent
wholesalers who solicit business on commission basis provide sufficient contact to make
corporation responsible for collection of state use tax) ; Northwestern States Portland
Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959); International Shoe Co. v. Fontenot,
236 La. 279, 107 So. 2d 640, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959) (systematic solicitation by salesmen sufficient to subject corporation to state income tax without
violation of due process); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector of Revenue,
234 La. 651, 101 So. 2d 70 (1958), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 28 (1959)
(presence of salesmen sufficient to subject corporation to state income tax without
placing undue burden on interstate commerce). The long arm of state regulation and
state judicial process with regard to the insurance business has been recognized in
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), and in Travelers Health
Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
3 In McGee the Court unanimously held that any inconvenience to the insurer
in being held amenable to suit in California did not amount to a denial of due process,
citing Travelers v. Virginia. This suggests that the test for legislative jurisdiction
may be the same as that for judicial jurisdiction.
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would seem contrary to the expressed desire of Congress to leave regulation in the hands of the states; the Court in the instant case recognized
this desire when it stated that Congress intended federal law to be displaced
only by the regulation of "the state in which the deception is practiced and
has its impact." 36 The Unauthorized Insurers False Advertising Process
Act is designed to fulfill this function. Moreover, the activities which the
act employs as the nexus required for the exercise of jurisdiction are the
very activities which give rise to the problems which the state seeks to solve.
This causal connection further strengthens the argument in favor of the
37
act's constitutionality.
In deciding what jurisdiction and what bodies are to regulate the
business of insurance, there is no danger that a regulatory vacuum may be
created, for the language of the McCarran-Ferguson Act clearly precludes
that. Nor is the basic question whether FTC regulation would be more
effective than that of the states.3 8 Rather the problem involves the effective limits of state regulatory power and the implementation of a congressional policy expressed in sparse and somewhat ambiguous legislative
history. The Court in the instant case has begun to provide an answer
insofar as it has delineated the issues for future resolution.

MUNIMIPAL LAW-GEm-.AL
HEM

To PREEMPT LocAL

SCHEmE op STATE PENAL CoDE

CRimiNAL REGISTRATION

ORDInANCE

In an action for declaratory and injunctive relief,' plaintiff challenged
the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance which required registration
86 Instant case at 299.
3
7See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317-19 (1945).
38 See also note 15 supra.
1 The court considers the propriety of the vehicle of challenge-the declaratory
judgment action-only in a footnote. Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d
674, 678 rn2, 349 P2d 974, 977 n.2 (1960). Some question as to propriety would
seem to be present under California's statute, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1060, which
provides for declaratory relief only to those parties seeldng a "declaration of [their]
rights or duties with respect to another .

.

.

."

(Emphasis added.)

But the state

courts have read the statute as if it allowed-as does UNIFORa Dci.a xTORy JtmIMENTS ACT § 1-the determination of the "rights, status, and other legal relations"
in a given context. Compare the result in Agnew v. Culver City, 51 Cal. 2d 474, 334
P.2d 571 (1959), with the language of UNiFoRm DECLARATORY JUDGMEiNTs ACT § 2.
The Abbott court compares plaintiff's dilemma with that of a person told he must
taste a suspect substance in order to determine whether it is a mushroom or a toadstool.

See BoRcrARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 278 (1934).

But the situation is

in fact more analogous to one where the victim has swallowed the substance and is
now asking a declaration that it is not poisonous. The question presented in the
Abbott case is not the dilemma of the plaintiff in choosing a course of conduct but
rather the legal results of a course of conduct already followed. If, however, the
usual concern of the court in a declaratory judgment action is with those who will
be forced to choose in the future, it may be proper for the court to analyze broadly
the legislation in question, even though such an analysis goes beyond the narrower
question presented by the litigation before it. For further discussions of this point,
see BORCHrARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 764-98, 1020-36 (2d ed. 1941); 6 Moom_,

FEDmRA PRACTICE 1 57 (1955) ; 35 CALn .L. REv. 252 (1947).
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with the chief of police by persons who had been convicted of any of a wide
variety of crimes.2 Plaintiff's complaint alleged and his testimony showed
that he had failed to register although the ordinance dearly required him
to do so. The California Supreme Court, reversing the trial court's determination that the ordinance was valid, held that the state's penal code,
which specifically provided both for sex offender registrations and also
for removal of the disabilities of persons who had fulfilled the conditions
of their probation, 4 had preempted the criminal registration field. Abbott
v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 349 P.2d 974 (1960).

The term preemption in the state-local context 5 denotes that a local
enactment is invalid as contrary to state legislative policy, 6 either because
the state legislative scheme in the area in question is so comprehensive as
to leave no room for local enactments on the same subject 7 or because the
local legislation conflicts or is inconsistent with state legislative determinations.8 The doctrine of preemption derives from the widely espoused
2Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 52.38-.43 (1936) provides that persons convicted in California or elsewhere of any felony or other enumerated crimes
must register, be fingerprinted, and be photographed; all records are required to be
kept confidential.
3 CAJ.. PEN. CODE § 290 provides for registration of sex offenders -within thirty
days; the challenged local ordinance allowed only five days. Los ANGELES, CAL.,
MUmIcIPA. CODE § 52.39 (1936).
4 CAI. PEN. CODE § 1203.4.
5 Cf. 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1224 (1960), which deals with federal-state preemption.
The analysis there developed is helpful so long as it is kept in mind that the source
of congressional power is the Constitution, whereas the relationship between state
and local governments is governed by the doctrine that municipalities are the mere
creatures of the state, having no independent existence or powers. See 1 ANTIEAU,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 2.05 (1958); 2 McQuuLLIN, MuNICIPAL. CORPORATIONs § 4.03 (3d ed. 1949).
6Among recent writings dealing with state-local relations, only one commentator
has used the term "preemption" generically in speaking of the subject. See 72
HARv. L. REv. 737, 744 (1959). Other writers, not referring to "preemption," have
attempted to describe the relation and enunciate the basis of ordinance-invalidating
decisions as a conflict or inconsistency between state and local governments either
because of duplication of effort, CHROSTVAITE & SMEDLEY, PENNSYLVANIA MUNICIPAL
ORDINANCES 13 (1954), or because of an actual divergence in policy or result. See
5 McQuTLIN, op. cit. supra note 5, §§ 15.20-.21; 1 YoxuEY, MUNICIPAL. CoRoRATio s
§ 83 (1956).
3E.g., People v. Mosely, 142 Cal. App. 2d 871, 299 P.2d 745 (1956) (statute requiring the keeping of buildings in repair overrides ordinance requiring the keeping of
sinks in repair); City of Golden v. Ford, 348 P.2d 951 (Colo. 1960) (state Labor

Peace Act leaves no room for ordinance regulating picketing); Davis v. City &

County of Denver, 342 P.2d 674 (Colo. 1959) (state motor vehicle law overrides
local driving-under-suspension ordinance); City of Fond Du Lac v. Town of Empire,
273 Wis. 333, 77 N.W.2d 699 (1956) (general state laws on subterranean waters
preclude local regulations on wells). But cf. Kennedy v. City of Newark, 29 N.J.
178, 148 A.2d 473 (1959) (state residence requirements for civil employees do not
preclude an ordinance covering city employees); Schildhaus v. Gilroy, 195 N.Y.S.2d
124, 126 (Sup. Ct 1959) (dictum) (ordinance setting higher fees and penalties than
statute not necessarily invalid) ; Retail Master Bakers Ass'n v. County of Allegheny,
400 Pa. 1, 161 A.2d 36 (1960) (state regulations for bakeries do not preclude local
regulations for same).
SE.g., Old Colony Gardens, Inc. v. City of Stamford, 147 Conn. 60, 156 A.2d
515 (1959) (municipality cannot revive rent control after repeal by state); Miami
Shores Village v. Win. N. Brockway Post #124 of Am. Legion, 156 Fla. 673,
677-78, 24 So. 2d 33, 35 (1945) (dictum) (building owner cannot rely on local re-
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9
notion that municipal governments are the mere creatures of the state,
having of themselves no power to legislate; indeed, the contrary view-that,
even in the absence of enabling constitutional provisions, there is inherent
power in municipalities to legislate on their own affairs-has few adherents.1" However, the constitutions of at least twenty-four states, in12
cluding California,:" contain home rule provisions which in varying ways
13
purport to create limited local legislative power.
The constitutional provision 14 operative in the instant case gave
municipalities the power to make such police regulations as do not "conflict"
with state laws.15 Yet the court, while speaking in terms of actual conflict
6
as regards sex offenders and successful probationers,' based its invalidation
of the ordinance primarily on a finding that the state legislature had in17
While the
tended to occupy the entire field of criminal registration.
liberty-restricting aspects of the ordinance may have influenced the court's
thinking, 18 the opinion refers to questions of the ordinance's impact on the

zoning which conflicts with state policy) ; Hertz Washmobile Sys. v. Village of So.
Orange, 41 N.J. Super. 110, 124 A.2d 68 (Super. Ct. 1956), aff'd, 25 N.J. 207, 135 A.2d
524 (1957) (ordinance permitting what statute impliedly prohibits is invalid) ; City of
Washington v. Thompson, 160 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio C.P. 1949) (ordinance purporting to
outlaw local licensing of peddlers invalid in face of statute allowing same). But cf.
City of Des Moines v. Reiter, 102 N.W.2d 363 (Iowa 1960) (ordinance against interference with city employees not in conflict with state statute against interference with
service of process) ; City of Garden City v. Miller, 181 Kan. 360, 311 P.2d 306 (1957)
(ordinance not necessarily superseded by state statute despite identity of language).
9 2 McQuLmmr, op. cit. supra note 5, § 4.03.
10 1 AxNrEAu, op. cit. supra note 5, § 2.05; 2 McQmuiLLi, op. cit. supra note 5,
§§ 4.03, .82. But ef. 1 YoyrLEY, op. cit. supra note 6, § 73. Perhaps the leading
argument for inherent home rule is that made by Judge Vann in People ex rel.
Metropolitan St Ry. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 174 N.Y. 417, 431, 67 N.E. 69,
70-71 (1903) ; at present, however, only Indiana and Montana can be said to adhere
to the doctrine. 2 McQouxiN, op. cit. supra note 5, § 4.82; see State ex rel.
Geake v. Fox, 158 Ind. 126, 63 N.E. 19 (1902) ; Hersey v. Neilson, 47 Mont. 132,
142, 131 Pac. 30, 32 (1913) (dictum). But cf. Ice, Municipal Home Rule in Indiana,
17 IND. L.J. 375, 386 (1942). A leading opinion in the field was and is People ex rel.
LeRoy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44 (1871), but in 1912 Michigan put the power of the
municipality over "municipal concerns" on a constitutional basis. Miche. CoNsT.
art. VIII, §21.
1
CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, §§ 6-82, 11.
12 72 HARv. L. Rzv. 737, 738 n.12 (1959). The author cites twenty-five but MINN.
CoNsT. art. IV, § 36, has since been repealed. No effort was made to classify the
wide variety of methods by which the implementation of home rule was attempted.
'3 For example, the constitution may provide that the adopted local charter shall
not "conflict!' with state laws. ARiz. CoNsT. art XIII, § 2. It may allow local laws
limited only by state legislation of "general application." GA. CoNsT. art. XIV,
§2-8301. It may require that local laws be "consistent with and subject to the
constitution and laws of the state." Mo. CoNsT. art. VI, § 19. Or the locality may
be given full power over "municipal affairs." UTAu Co ST. art. XI, § 5.
14 CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, § 11.
15 It was unquestioned that the challenged ordinance was a police regulation.
16 53 Cal. 2d at 685-88, 349 P.2d at 982-84.
17 "It thus -appears that the penal system adopted by the state constitutes a
complete legislative scheme intended to occupy the field." 53 Cal. 2d at 687, 349
P.2d at 983.
18 It has been argued that the personal liberty aspect should have great bearing.
Antieau, The Constitutional Rights of Persons Charged With Violating Municipal'
Ordinances, 48 GEo. L.J. 1 (1959). Certainly it cannot be argued that ordinances
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plaintiff's individual freedoms merely as "interesting" ' 9 and passes on
immediately to examine the legislation itself. The resulting finding of
"conflict" is based on a broad interpretation of that term. Even though
it may have been that to strike down the actually conflicting portions of
the ordinance would have so emasculated the legislative scheme that invalidation of the entire ordinance would have been required, unconstitutionality was not rested on this ground. And insofar as the holding is based
on an unexpressed intent of the state legislature to preclude all criminal
registration plans other than that of the state, it reflects a restrictive attitude
toward the power of municipalities to govern themselves-an attitude by
no means universal 2 0 and one which even runs counter to the letter of the
California home rule provision. 2 1 The very use of the word "conflict"
when terms more easily interpreted against the existence of broad local
police powers might have been employed 22 indicates that local enactments
should be invalidated only where actual conflict in terms exists or where the
concurrent enforcement of both state and local policies would produce
of this type do not constitute a restraint on freedom of movement. See Note,
Criminal Registration Ordinances: Police Control Over Potential Recidivists, 103
U. PA. L. Rzv. 60 (1954). While the court in the instant case discussed the contentions and views of recent writers on the subject of registration ordinances, 53
Cal. 2d at 679-80 n.5, 349 P.2d at 978 n.5, there is no indication in the opinion
that considerations of restriction of personal liberty influenced the decision of the
case.
19 53 Cal. 2d at 681, 349 P.2d at 979. Note, however, that all of plaintiff's
arguments were directed at the impact of the ordinance upon his constitutional freedoms. Respondent's Petition for Rehearing, p. 1.
20New York has upheld the imposition of heavier penalties by ordinance than
are imposed by statute for the same offense. Schildhaus v. Gilroy, 195 N.Y.S.2d 124,
126 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (dictum). New Jersey has rejected the argument that an
ordinance denouncing what a statute in the same area neither expressly denounced
nor permitted was invalid. Masters-Jersey, Inc. v. Mayor & Gen. Council, 32 N.J.
296, 160 A.2d 841 (1960). Connecticut has said that a statute permitting auctions
during certain hours of the day does not conflict with an ordinance forbidding them
during part of that same period. State v. Gordon, 143 Conn. 698, 125 A.2d 477
(1956). See City of Des Moines v. Reiter, 102 N.W.2d 363 (Iowa 1960) ; City of
Garden City v. Miller, 181 Kan. 360, 311 P.2d 306 (1957) ; Department of Licenses &
Inspections v. Weber, 394 Pa. 466, 147 A.2d 326 (1959). But cf. People v. Mosely,
142 Cal. App. 2d 871, 299 P.2d 745 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956) ; Hertz Washmobile Sys.
v. Village of So. Orange, 41 N.J. Super. 110, 124 A.2d 68 (Super. Ct 1956),
aff'd, 25 N.J. 207, 135 A.2d 524 (1957); City of Fond Du Lac v. Town of
Empire, 273 Wis. 333, 77 N.W. 2d 699 (1956). In Colorado the rule has been
stated that local enactments on local subjects superseded state enactments. Davis v.
City & County of Denver, 342 P.2d 674, 676 (Colo. 1959) (dictum). Yet the
Colorado courts have struck down a city's attempt to regulate picketing on the
grounds that state labor legislation has covered the field and that municipalities have
only such powers as are delegated to them. City of Golden v. Ford, 348 P.2d 951
(Colo. 1960). Generally, only a case-by-case analysis will give a true idea of the law
of a given jurisdiction. See 2 McQu.LrIN, op. cit. supra note 5, §4.03.
21 See note 14 supra, and the discussion of the provision in Peppin, Municipal
Home Rule in CaliforniaIII: Section 11 of Article XI of the California Constitution,
32 CALIF. L. Ray. 341, 351-55 (1944), concluding that California gives municipalities
power coextensive with that of the state in regard to the regulation of the conduct of
citizens. The conclusion would seem to be, however, that the decisions are by no
means uniform.
22See note 13 supra. For a discussion of the judicial treatment of the word
"conflict" in the Ohio constitution, see generally Fordham & Asher, Home Rule in
Theory and Practice, 9 Oio ST. L.J. 18 (1948).
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irreconcilable results. Conflict in administration should not be presumed
simply because the state and local enactments speak to the same subject of
regulation. 23 A finding of constitutional conflict should be made only
where it appears that there will be difficulties of administration directly
traceable to the duplicity of legislation and curable only by the invalidation
of what is otherwise a valid ordinance,24 or that to conform with the express
or dearly inferable state policy would produce conduct so at variance with
that required by the ordinance that the individual cannot reasonably be
expected to obey both.25 This latter type of conflict existed in the instant
case between the statute removing disabilities from probationers who had
fulfilled certain requirements and the provision of the ordinance reimposing
a registration disability.26 But the resolution of this conflict does not
necessarily require the invalidation of the entire ordinance; a less drastic
solution-and one which would leave the municipality free to enact a nonconflicting ordinance-would have been merely to prohibit the ordinance's
application to ex-probationers.

MAY NOT ISSUE
STRIES AND BOYCOTTS-IlJiuNOTio
AGAINST STRIKE To ENFORCE, DEMAIND FOR UNIoN-RA.RoAD
JOB-FREEZE, AGREEMENT PRIOR TO ABOLITION OF PosrioNs HE
BY UNION

[ERMBERS

In November, 1957, respondent interstate railway petitioned the South
Dakota Public Utility Commission for permission to institute in that state
a "central agency plan" whereby the service area of certain station agents
would be extended to include neighboring stations which would then be
dosed. The railway contended that existing agencies were too numerous
for efficient operation ' and were producing large deficits. 2 Public hearings
were held at which petitioner union opposed the plan, adoption of which
23

Thus the court here speaks of "the inevitable conflict of jurisdiction which
would result from dual regulations covering the same ground. Only by such a broad
definition of 'conflict' is it possible to confine local legislation to its proper field of
supplementary regulation." 53 Cal. 2d at 682, 349 P.2d at 980, quoting from Pipoly v.
Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 366, 371, 125 P.2d 482, 485 (1942). But cf. the discussion of
"conflicts in administration" in 108 U. PA. L. Rav. 1224, 1228 (1960).
2
4 E.g., In re Condemnation of Blocks 13, 14, & 15, 144 Neb. 67, 12 N.W.2d
540 (1943).
2 5
E.g., City of Washington v. Thompson, 160 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio C.P. 1949).
2653 Cal. 2d at 688-89, 349 P.2d at 984.
1 The South Dakota Commission found that in the 69 one-man stations involved
in that state, the daily work load averaged 59 minutes. The Iowa commission determined that the same average was 74 minutes in that state and that this would be
increased to three hours and 15 minutes for the stations retained under the "central
agency plan." Order of -R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & No. W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330,
348 & n.3 (1960) (Whittaker, J., dissenting).
2 The South Dakota commission found that for the 69 stations involved, expenses
exceeded related revenues by $170,399 in 1956 whereas there would have been a
surplus of $58,884 for the same period had the "central agency plan" been in effect.
Id. at 348 n.3.
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3
would abolish positions held by many of its members. While the state
PUC decision was still pending, the union notified the railway, pursuant
to section 6 of the Railway Labor Act,4 that it wished to change the existing collective bargaining agreement by adding a provision that "no position
in existence on December 3, 1957, will be abolished or discontinued except
by agreement between the carrier and the organization." 5 The railway
answered that it did not consider the demand a proper subject for bargaining under the Railway Labor Act but agreed, without waiving its position,
to meet with the union to discuss related matters. 6 After failure of negotiation and mediation, both parties refused to submit the dispute to
arbitration and the union voted to strike. The railway then filed for
injunctive relief in the federal district court, alleging that the strike would
be based upon an unlawful bargaining demafid. Finding that the union's
demands were not unlawful, the district court denied the injunction.7 The
court of appeals reversed,3 holding that inasmuch as the union's demand did
not relate to "rates of pay, rules, and working conditions" 9 it was not a
subject of mandatory bargaining under the Railway Labor Act and was,
therefore, not a "labor dispute" within the Norris-LaGuardia Act's ban on
labor injunctions.'0 On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed, holding
that there was a labor dispute within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia
injunction ban and that the strike could not he enjoined as an attempt by the
union to bargain about an unlawful object. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v.
Chicago & No. W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
The railway labor field is governed primarily by two federal statutes,
the Railway Labor Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act." The NorrisLaGuardia Act denies the federal courts jurisdiction to issue injunctions
against strikes involving or growing out of labor disputes, 12 "labor disputes"
being defined as controversies concerning "terms or conditions of employ3
See Chicago & No. W. Ry. v. Order of R.R. Telegraphers, 264 F.2d 254, 257
(7th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
4 48 Stat. 1197 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1958).
5
Order of R.R.Telegraphers v. Chicago & No. W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330, 332 (1960).
6
The railway suggested and the union refused to discuss several means of
cushioning the job eliminations including: (1) transfer of displaced agents to
productive jobs, (2) setting an annual limit on job eliminations, and (3) supplemental unemployment benefits for displaced employees. Id. at 341 n.6 (dissenting
opinion).
7The opinion of the district court is not reported.
8
Chicago & No. W. Ry. v. Order of R.R. Telegraphers, 264 F.2d 254 (7th Cir.
1959).
9 48 Stat 1187 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152 First (1958).
1047 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1958). The key provisions of the act are found in §§ 104, 107, and 113.
11 The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Procedure Act, 73 Stat.
519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (Supp. 1959), is applicable to railway labor except
for those portions of the act which serve to amend the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947, added by 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 401(c) (Supp. 1959) ; certain
sections of the Interstate Commerce Act concern railway labor, e.g., 41 Stat. 477
(1920), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1(18), (20) (1958).
1247 Stat.70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
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The act is prefaced by a statement of purpose setting

forth a congressional policy of preventing the courts from using injunctions
to impede the normal functioning of collective bargaining; 14 it severely
limits, where it does not completely deny, the jurisdiction of federal courts
to issue labor injunctions. 15 The Railway Labor Act places a duty upon
carriers and their employees "to make and maintain agreements concerning
16 It sets up a fourrates of pay, rules, and working conditions .
stage procedure for settling disputes arising in the making of these agreements 17 and a separate procedure for resolving controversies arising under
them.' 8 Limitations on the free association of employees are forbidden and
there is provision for the independent self-organization of employees to
carry out the purposes of the act; 9 both of these rights may be enforced
*."..,

1347 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1958).
1447 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1958).
1547 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1958). Section 4 of the
act absolutely denies jurisdiction to issue injunctions against certain enumerated
activities including strikes, publicizing a labor dispute, peaceful picketing, and joining
a labor organization. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958). Even where the
activity is not enumerated in § 4, the federal courts may issue labor injunctions only
on a finding, after a proper hearing, that unlawful acts have been threatened by the
defendant, irreparable injury will follow, denial of relief will be more harmful to
the complainant than its granting will be to the defendant, there is no adequate
ren~edy at law, and public officers are unable or unwilling to protect the complainant's
property. 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1958).
1648 Stat. 1187 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152 First (1958).
17 The procedure is: negotiation (48 Stat. 1187 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152 Second
(1958)) ; mediation (48 Stat. 1195 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 155 First (1958)) ; acceptance
or refusal of arbitration (44 Stat. 582 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 157 First
(1958)); and, absent referral to presidential intervention (44 Stat. 586 (1926), 45
U.S.C. §160 (1958), economic pressure. Such disputes are initiated by notice
under § 6 of the act. 48 Stat 1197 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1958). For an analysis
of this procedure, see Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722-28 (1945),
where the Court first discussed the difference between "major" and "minor" disputes
under the Railway Labor Act and first applied those labels to the two classes of
disputes. It describes "major" disputes as those "over the formation of collective
agreements or efforts to secure them . . . . They look to the acquisition of rights
for the future, not to assertion of rights claimed to have vested in the past" Id. at
723. The Court found the statutory source for this classification of disputes in the
general purposes section of the Railway Labor Act, 48 Stat 1187 (1934), 45 U.S.C.
§§ 15la(4), (5) (1958). Id. at 722. Since the Court found the present controversy
a major labor dispute under the Railway Labor Act, the railway's refusal to arbitrate
would have been sufficient ground on which to deny injunctive relief since it constituted a failure to make every reasonable effort to settle the dispute before seeking
an injunction. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W.R.R., 321 U.S.
50 (1944), interpreting § 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat 72, 29 U.S.C.

§ 108 (1958).
18The scheme for these "minor" disputes is: negotiation (48 Stat. 1187 (1934),
45 U.S.C. § 152 Second (1958)) ; compulsory arbitration at the choice of either party
(48 Stat. 1191 (1934), 45 U.S.C. §§ 153 First (i), (m) (1958)); and, if neither
party submits the dispute to arbitration, possible referral to presidential intervention
(44 Stat. 586 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1958) )-although it is unlikely that such a
dispute would be important enough to merit such treatment-or economic pressure.
These disputes are initiated by a different procedure from that used in "major" disputes. 48 Stat 1188 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152 Sixth (1958). The Court has defined
these "minor" disputes as controversies relating "either to the meaning or proper
application of a particular [contract] provision with reference to a specific situation
or to an omitted case." Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, supra note 17, at 723.
These rights are
1948 Stat 1187 (1934), 45 U.S.C. §§ 15la(2), (3) (1958).
further described in the general duties section of the act, 48 Stat. 1187 (1951), 45
U.S.C. § 152 Third, Fourth, Fifth (1958).
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and bargaining procedures. 21 A reading of

the act's specific provisions in relation to its statement of general purposes
suggests that the Railway Labor Act creates no duty to settle any dispute
which does not concern the making of agreements on "rates of pay, rules,
and working conditions," grievances under these agreements, or the right
to organize independent of railroad control. 22 Because there is no administrative agency empowered to enforce or apply the Railway Labor Act,
this duty devolves upon the courts, raising the question of the courts' power,
under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, to issue injunctions to uphold the mandates of the Railway Labor Act. The Norris-LaGuardia Act has been
applied to disputes arising under the Railway Labor Act,28 but the Supreme Court has held that in certain areas the former statute must be
24
harmonized with the pattern of congressional railway labor legislation.
20 48 Stat. 1189 (1934), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Tenth (1958). The maximum penalty is $20,000 and six months' imprisonment for each day of violation.
21 The procedure for settling disputes relating to the alleged denial by a railroad,
its officers, or its agents of the rights to free association and collective bargaining
is: negotiation (48 Stat 1187 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152 Second (1958)); mediation
(48 Stat. 1195 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 155 First (b) (1958)); voluntary arbitration
(44 Stat. 582 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 157 First (1958)); and presidential intervention
(44 Stat 586-87 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1958)) or economic pressure.
Unlike those sections of the act setting up specific procedural requirements for
resolving either major or minor disputes, these sections contain language making
them applicable to "any" or "all" disputes.
22 The general purposes section of the Railway Labor Act is the source of the
three previous classes of disputes; the only subsection which could serve as a source
for a further duty to settle disputes would be (1), which states that it is the purpose
of the act "to avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier
engaged therein." 48 Stat. 1186 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 151a(1) (1958). This argument
might be supported by the "any" or "all" disputes language discussed in note 21
.upra. However, this reading of the act is at best farfetched, in view of the ample
reasons for applying this general "all" disputes language to the three classes of
disputes discussed in notes 17, 18, and 21 supra. And such a reading did not commend itself to the Court in Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722-28, 729
n.26 (1945). Nor have the courts held any labor dispute under the Railway Labor
Act to be within this fourth possible class. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
New York Cent. R.R., 246 F.2d 114 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 877 (1957)
(strike to prevent closing of railroad yard not a labor dispute under the Railway
Labor
Act).
23
See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W.R.R., 321 U.S.
50 (1944); Butte, A. & Pac. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 268 F.2d 54
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 864 (1959); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Central
of Ga. Ry., 229 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1956).
24
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 40
(1957); Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515, 563 (1937). Some of the
areas in which the Court has harmonized the two acts are: protecting the jurisdiction
of the NRAB, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & Ind. R.R., .rpra;
preventing management from maintaining a company union against the express purpose of the Railway Labor Act, Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n, srupra; preventing a
"white" union from bargaining to eliminate the positions held by a Negro union,
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); preventing a union
from discriminating against Negro members of the same trade, Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949) ; preventing a strike on a major
dispute prior to the exhaustion of the Railway Labor Act procedures, American
Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 169 F. Supp. 777, 787-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) ;
and preventing union coercion in fields of exclusive management concern, New York
Cent R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 140 F. Supp. 273 (N.D. Ohio 1956)
(alternative holding), aff'd on other grounds, 246 F.2d 114 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 877 (1957).
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The Court has never been called upon to determine the rights of parties in
a controversy which is a labor dispute under the Norris-LaGuardia Act
but which does not fall into an area in which the Railway Labor Act creates
25
a duty to bargain.
The railway argued 26 and the Court analyzed 27
s the instant case from
the point of view of whether the controversy was a labor dispute within the
meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia ban on labor injunctions, 28 and, if so,
whether the threatened strike might nevertheless be enjoined as part of
an attempt to bargain about an unlawful object. 29 But a more rewarding
analysis of the case is based on an interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act in the light of the other congressional legislation in the railway labor
field.30 While the Court did consider certain pertinent questions of statutory interpretation in determining that the union's bargaining demand was
legal and therefore within the injunction ban, 31 these arguments might have
been considered more fruitfully had they been weighed against the purposes of the Norris-LaGuardia and Railway Labor Acts.
The Court's initial determination that the present controversy fell
within the Norris-LaGuardia Act's definition of labor dispute3 2 is open to
three objections. First, neither the clear meaning of the statutory language
nor its previous interpretation compels such a reading of the definition.
"Terms of employment" appears to mean not the existence of contract terms
but comprehends rather wages, hours, severance pay, seniority, job transfers, rate of attrition, union security, and the like; and "conditions of
employment" would seem to describe working conditions-that is, the
physical conditions under which the work is to be performed, the proper
clothes to be worn, the number of coffee breaks, and the like. These are the
areas in which the federal courts and the NLRB have commonly found
"labor disputes" to exist.3 3

On the other hand, the existence of temporary

25 The Court avoids this problem in the instant case by finding that "the union's
effort to negotiate . . . with the railroad was in obedience to the Act's command
that employees . . . exert every reasonable effort to settle all disputes 'concerning
rates of pay, rules, and working conditions."' Instant case at 339. Compare Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. New York Cent. R.R., 246 F.2d 114 (6th Cir. 1957).
26
Respondent's Brief on the Merits, pp. 25-65.
27 Instant case at 335-41.
281d. at 335-36.
29 Id. at 336-41; Respondent's Brief on the Merits, pp. 29-62.
30The Court used this statutory interpretation approach in the only previous
case in which the activity to be enjoined fell under the absolute denial of jurisdiction
to issue injunctions in § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the railroad had met
all the prerequisites of that act and the Railway Labor Act. Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Chicago R. & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
al Instant case at 336-40.
3
2 "Plainly the controversy here relates to an effort on the part of the union to
change the 'terms' of an existing collective bargaining agreement. The change desired just as plainly referred to 'conditions of employment' of the railroad's employees
who are represented by the union. The employment of. many of these station agents
inescapably hangs on the number of railroad stations that will be either completely
abandoned or consolidated with other stations." Instant case at 336.
33 For a summary of the cases defining the term "labor dispute" under the NorrisLaGuardia Act, see 31 TurL. L. Rav. 554-57 (1957).
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4
railway job-freeze provisions 3 and manaement prerogative clauses 35 in
labor contracts might be regarded as indicating that the Norris-LaGuardia
30
Second,
definition of labor dispute comprehends the present controversy.
37
the court of appeals' finding that the union's demand
the Court rejected
3
by analogizing
pertained to matters of exclusive management concern
40
9
provisions which provide
from the current statutory 8 and contractual
for cushioning the blow of railway job loss to the proposition that it was
4
W ile
not illegal to bargain for protection against that loss itself. '

34 See Respondent's Brief on the Merits, p. 17.
35 CCH UNION CONTRACT CLAUSES 619 (1954).

86 Nevertheless, the presence of such clauses in existing contracts is no more
than circumstantial evidence that the present controversy is a labor dispute. The
fact that management has permitted temporary job-freeze clauses to be written into
railway labor contracts is no proof that it could not have enjoined the union from
striking to force the inclusion of such a clause; it is as likely that the railroads granted
this protection to the unions in return for concessions on the part of the union. Again,
as to the management prerogative clauses, the fact that management has sought a
contract guarantee of its right to operate freely in certain fields is most likely to be
the result of a desire to make doubly sure of noninterference in these fields or to
provide a firm basis for settlement of disputes in these areas in the face of a union
contention that these actions give rise to a grievance dispute under the contract. This
be particularly important if the contract contained an arbitration clause.
would
37
1nstant case at 336-38.
38 The reasoning of the court of appeals is less than completely clear on this
issue since that court fails to differentiate among a labor dispute under the NorrisLaGuardia Act, a labor dispute under the Railway Labor Act, the scope of mandatory
bargaining, and the scope of exclusive management prerogative. However, it seems
legitimate to read that court's opinion as holding that one of the tests for a labor
dispute under the Norris-LaGuardia ban on injunctions is that the controversy must
fall outside the area which has been "traditionally and rightfully management's."
Chicago & No. W. Ry. v. Order of R.R. Telegraphers, 264 F.2d 254, 258 (7th Cir.
1959), rev'd, 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
9 Interstate Commerce Act, 54 Stat. 905 (1940), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5(2)
(1958). As to abandonments and consolidations of facilities, the ICC formulated a
similar policy for compensation for displaced employees in Chicago, B. & Q.R.R.
Abandonment, 257 I.C.C. 700 (1944). In hearings on the general revision of those
portions of the Interstate Commerce Act dealing with unifications, mergers, and
acquisitions of control, 54 Stat. 906 (1940), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §5(2)(f)
(1958), Representative Harrington urged that provision be made that the ICC
approve no transaction which would result in job loss for the present employees
of the carriers. 84 CONG. REc. 9882 (1939). However, the section was enacted to
require the ICC to follow the four-year cushioning standard of the Washington
for the protection of displaced employees.
Agreement
4
oWashington Agreement of May, 1936. This agreement provides for a fouryear period during which the railroads must compensate displaced or relocated
employees for the financial loss entailed in the changes made by the railroad. It was
approved by railroads controlling 85% of the nation's rail mileage. Hearings
Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on HR. 2531,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. 216-17 (1939). These hearings also contain the text of the
Washington Agreement. Id. at 231-41.
41The Court makes this transition by noting a trend of railway legislation "to
broaden, not narrow, the scope of subjects about which workers and railroads may
or must negotiate and bargain collectively," without citing any such legislation. It
continues: "furthermore, the whole idea of what is bargainable has been greatly
affected by the practices and customs of the railroads and their employees themselves.
It is too late now to argue that employees can have no collective voice to influence
railroads to act in a way that will preserve the interests of the employees as well
as the interests of the railroad and the public at large." Instant case at 338. Either
this is a reference to the materials discussed in notes 39-40 infra, in which case the
transition from temporary to permanent protection has not been made, or it refers
to the earlier statement of the Court that "in the collective bargaining world today,
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stringent cushioning provisions or vigorous attempts to upgrade the job
classifications of the agents retained might discourage job eliminations, it
would seem that the Court missed a conceptual distinction of a basic order
in equating provisions by which labor may share the fruits and avoid some
of the personal damages arising from the institution of technical or administrative improvements with a contract clause which would give the union
a right to bargain directly to prevent the making of these improvements.
It is as illogical to suggest that the present controversy is a labor dispute
because agreements resulting from previous labor disputes have affected
management choice in the elimination of facilities as it is to argue that
those previous controversies over rates of pay, hours, severance pay, and
42
the like were not labor disputes because they affected management choices.
And third, in view of the indefiniteness of the statutory definition of labor
dispute, further illumination of what Congress meant by "terms or conditions of employment" may be sought in other congressional labor legislation
defining the area in which collective bargaining is to be used.4 3 While the
Court is correct that as a general principle, "Congress made the definition
broad because it wanted it to be broad" 44 -that is, Congress wanted no
repetition of the judicial emasculation of the Clayton Act's 45 attempt to
is not to make
limit the use of labor injunctions 4Q-to state that principle
47
it applicable to the highly regulated railroad industry.
The Court, moreover, having refused to consider any arguments for
narrowing the Norris-LaGuardia definition of labor dispute, proceeded to
there is nothing strange about agreements that affect the permanency of employment,"
instant case at 336, which is again either a reference to agreements merely "affecting"
the length or term of employment by requiring some temporary measure of job
security, or else a contention, unsupported by authority, that provisions denying the
railroad the right to eliminate positions without union consent already exist in the
railroad field. As to this latter contention, the railway's brief attacked the district
court's finding that such agreements were already in existence on other railroads,
contending that the only three agreements cited as similar in current railroad contracts
were limited to a term of years. Respondent's Brief on the Merits, p. 17.
42 But note that the Norris-LaGuardia Act affirmatively denies the jurisdiction
to issue injunctions in controversies concerning the terms or conditions of employment; it does not give management any positive protection as to its prerogatives.
Hence it is proper to permit contract clauses forbidding, for example, subcontracting,
since by the use of such devices the employer could otherwise nullify the agreement
on the terms and conditions of employment concerning which he was required by law
to bargain. See Continental Can Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 67 (1956).
43 When the Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed, federal law generally provided no
positive command that certain subjects be bargained collectively. The subsequent
passage of the Wagner Act 49 Stat 449 (1935), and the Taft-Hartley Act; 61
Stat. 136 (1947), codified together as 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1958), suggests that
the laissez faire policy of the earlier act should be limited to those areas in which Congress had commanded that disputes be settled by collective bargaining, or at least
to those areas in which no alternative means of settlement was provided. But see
Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1937); American Chain & Cable Co. v.
Truck Drivers & Helpers Union, 68 F. Supp. 54 (D.N.J. 1946).
44
Instant case at 335.
4538 Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. §52 (1958).
46 See instant case at 336 & n.9. The classic case destroying the efficacy of
previous congressional attempts to limit the use of labor injunctions is Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
47 See notes 64-77 infra and accompanying text.
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analyze the present controversy in precisely those terms of "illegality of
object" 48 favored by the proponents of the labor injunction and specifically
rejected by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 49 This analysis, also, is deficient.
Section 4 of the act 50 absolutely denies the federal courts jurisdiction to
issue injunctions against strikes in labor disputes; 5 nor can a strike, no
matter what its object, be enjoined under section 7 of the act 52 inasmuch
as the limited jurisdiction there left to the federal courts to issue injunctions
in labor disputes covers only the prevention of violence beyond the control
of the public authorities.53 A second objection to the use of the illegality
analysis to provide exceptions to the Norris-LaGuardia Act ban on labor
injunctions is that it opens a gap in the act requiring constant court supervision to define that gap's limits. Neither the finding of the present Court
that the union sought no unlawful object, 54 nor previous determinations
that illegality under the Sherman Act, 55 the Interstate Commerce Act, 56
or state statutes 57 does not give the federal courts jurisdiction to issue
injunctions in labor disputes, guarantee that the illegality analysis will not
be used to thwart the clear purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.58
Finally, the Court fails to give proper weight to the problem of reconciling
the apparently conflicting congressional purposes in the Norris-LaGuardia

and Railway Labor Acts.59
48

In an unexplained-and seemingly unexplain-

Instant case at 338-41. But note that the Court did not hold that the
illegality of the union's object would necessarily have removed the case from the
Norris-LaGuardia injunction ban; rather, it found that since the present controversy did not arise from an unlawful bargaining demand, that question need
not be reached. Instant case at 340-41.
49 Section 5 of the act, 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 105 (1958), brings concerted action to do those acts protected under § 4 within the protection of the absolute ban on injunctions. The purpose of the section is to prevent the issuance of
injunctions on the ground that the acts sought to be enjoined are in violation of the
antitrust laws. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., Inc.,
311 U.S. 91 (1940).
5047 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §104 (1958).
51
The ban extends beyond strikes. 47 Stat 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
See note 15 .rupra.
5247 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1958).
See note 15 supra for a summary
of the findings required.
53 47 Stat 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1958).
54 Instant case at 341.
55 Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., Inc., 311 U.S. 91
(1940).
See also United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
56 East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 163 F.2d
10 (5th Cir. 1947); Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Keystone Freight Lines, Inc.,
126 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1942).
57 See Afran Transp. Co. v. National Maritime Union, 169 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y.
1958).
58 See the dissent of Mr. Justice Whittaker in the companion case to the present
case, Marine Cooks v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 372 (1960). This dissent
is of particular interest because it cites to the dissenting opinion in the present
case where the source of the alleged illegality was sought in federal statutes, yet in
the Marine Cooks case there was no suggested conflict with other federal statutes.
59 Compare the clear analysis of the question of statutory interpretation in
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957),
with the rambling analysis in the Court's opinion in the present case. In the former
case, the Court held that a strike might be enjoined despite the provisions of the
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able-statement, the Court holds that the present controversy concerned
"rates of pay, rules, and working conditions" 60 and thus was properly
raised under the Railway Labor Act.61 Neither the words themselves nor
previous judicial interpretations of their meaning 6 2 support the Court's
finding on this point. Both the history and the contents of the tvo acts
suggest that Congress intended to permit strikes in a narrower area under
the Railway Labor Act than under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The theory
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is one of laissez faire in labor disputes;
the act withdrew from the federal courts jurisdiction to intervene in the
collective bargaining situation.6 3 By contrast, the Railway Labor Act
shows no such faith in the efficacy of the strike as the final solution of
controversies between railroads and railroad unions. In grievance disputes
it makes binding arbitration available at the request of either party 6 and
offers mediation and voluntary arbitration to aid in the settlement of disputes concerning either contract changes or the right to organize independent of railroad interference. 65 It provides for presidential intervention
in the case of a dispute which threatens "to deprive any section of the
country of essential transportation service." 66 In addition to the national
Norris-LaGuardia Act when the Railway Labor Act provided an alternative procedure for reaching a final settlement in controversies and when the strike, if not
enjoined, would defeat the purpose of the Railway Labor Act. Similarly, in the
present case, the Court could profitably have analyzed the question as: (1) does
the Railway Labor Act require the railway to settle the present controversy with
the union, and (2) if not, does this negative mandate of the act remove a strike to
force such a settlement from the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act? Cf.
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Central of Ga. Ry., 229 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1956).
60 Instant case at 339.
61 "It would stretch credulity too far to say that the Railway Labor Act,
designed to protect railroad workers, was somehow violated by the union acting
precisely in accordance with that Act's purpose to obtain stability and permanence
in employment for workers. There is no express provision of law . . . making it
unlawful for unions to want to discuss with railroads actions that may vitally and
adversely affect the security, seniority and stability of railroad jobs." Instant case
at 339-40. Thus the Court apparently equated "concerning rates of pay" with "affecting the same." In so doing, the Court also misreads the primary purpose of the
act, which is "to avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any
carrier engaged therein .

.

.

."

48 Stat. 1186 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 151a (1958).

See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. New York Cent. R.RL, 246 F.2d 114
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 877 (1957), where the controversy affected railway
jobs in the same way that the present one does. Cf. Butte, A. & Pac. Ry. v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 268 F.2d 54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 864 (1959), where the railway, in the guise of its parent company, sought
not to eliminate the positions in question but to transfer them to another group of
workers. Note that the question of the size of work crews is a question of working
conditions, as is the size of the work assignment of the remaining agents under the
"central agency plan" in the present case. However, the union, in the present case,
sought to bargain not over the job assignments of the retained agents but over the
right to eliminate existing positions.
63This purpose and philosophy are clearly stated in the act. 47 Stat. 70 (1932),
29 U.S.C. § 102 (1958).
64 48 Stat. 1191 (1934), 45 U.S.C. §§ 153 First (i), (m) (1958).
65 48 Stat. 1195 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 155 First (b) (1958) ; 44 Stat. 582 (1926),
45 U.S.C. § 157 First (1958).
6644 Stat. 586 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1958).
62
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importance of the continued functioning of the railroad industry, a second
reason for the congressional limitation on the right of railway employees
to strike is apparent: control of the railroad industry is divided into not
two but three parts-the government shares with management and labor
67
the power to determine the policies and practices of the nation's railroads.
Thus many activities are closely regulated in the railroad field which in
most fields of business would be matters of pure management prerogative.68
Should labor in general lack a right to bargain, it would be unable to obtain
a hearing for or consideration of its rights, interests, or demands; railway
labor may present its arguments in a forum which is required by law or has
elected in its discretion to consider these interests in making final determinations.6 9 In other words, the power granted to the ICC " and the state
public utility commissions 7' to determine the interests of the public as a
whole, including those of both the railroads and railway labor, explains why
Congress would limit the duty to settle controversies between railroads
and labor to the right to organize and to the making and maintenance of
agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions. Thus
it seems proper to read the Railway Labor Act as a statement of a congressional policy that matters outside the enumerated areas should not be
67
See Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 379, as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1-27 (1958). As to state regulation, see, e.g., S.D. CoDE § 52,0932 (Supp. 1960);
Wis. STAT. § 196.81 (1957).
6
8 Among the areas subject to the supervision of the Interstate Commerce Commission are the elimination of money-losing lines and operations, the determination
of rates, and the protection of workers displaced in railway mergers.
69
The present case is an example. The union presented its case against the
consolidation of agencies before the state public utility commissions. While those
commissions are not bound by federal law to consider the effect on railway labor
in granting station discontinuances and consolidations, the standard of public convenience and necessity on which they base their determinations would properly include
the effects upon displaced labor. See ICC v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 315
U.S. 373 (1942), and United States v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225 (1939), for the ICC's
interpretation of two such standards in allowing discontinuances under the Interstate
Commerce Act. Moreover, the Railway Labor Act sets forth a definite procedure
by which agents displaced by the present change could negotiate or arbitrate the
question of remuneration for the loss of employment, since the railway, like the vast
majority of all railroads, is a party to the Washington Agreement of May, 1936,
described in note 40 supra. For the procedures available to the displaced agents,
see the discussion of "minor" dispute procedure under the Railway Labor Act, in
note 18 supra.
70 The power of the ICC to authorize abandonments was extended in the 1958
amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act. 72 Stat. 571, 49 U.S.C. § 13a (1958).
This section provides for the discontinuance or change of service of both interstate

and intrastate trains and ferries, and sets up a procedure by which the ICC may
authorize the discontinuance of wholly intrastate operations when the state law or
public utility commission has forbidden it. Among the factors to be taken into account
in a weighing of the public interest by the ICC in authorizing abandonments is the
effect on railway labor, and the protection that must be provided for railway labor
includes an effective plan for cushioning the effects of job loss resulting from the
change of operations. ICC v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 315 U.S. 373 (1942).
7
1 In amending the Interstate Commerce Act in 1958, the Senate version of the
present § 13a, 72 Stat 571, 49 U.S.C. § 13a (1958), included provision for the discontinuance of "station, depot or facility," S. 3778, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1958),
but this provision was eliminated in conference. 104 CONr. REc. 15645. (1958). See
id. at 15528 for an explanation of the deletion. For examples of such state regulation,
see statutes cited note 67 supra.
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the subjects of collective bargaining, 72 or at most, should be bargainable
7
only upon the voluntary concurrence of both parties. 3 And the histories
of the two acts suggest that precedence should be given to the mandates of
the Railway Labor Act. Not only does that act govern a specialized industry which Congress has dealt with apart from its general labor policy 74
but also the railway act was reenacted two years after the passage of
Norris-LaGuardia. 7"5 Nor is this means of reconciling the two acts new to
the Court; 76 moreover, it is the best explanation of the rationale underlying

72The argument that the railroads should not be allowed to bargain away the
benefits which might be obtained from changes of service authorized by the commissions receives support in that one of the purposes of the Interstate Commerce
Act is the maintenance of an economical and efficient railroad system whose financial
soundness is a matter of national concern. Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U.S.
182, 191-95 (1948); Seaboard A.L.R.R. v. Daniel, 333 U.S. 118, 124-25 (1948).
Moreover, Congress showed continuing concern for the financial soundness of the
nation's railroads in its 1958 amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act, 72 Stat.
568, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1(a) (2), (17) (a), 13(4), 13a, 15a(3), 303(b) (6), 303(c), 1231-40
(1958). Among the relief provided was liberalization of the ICC standards for rate
determination, extension of ICC power over abandonments, and provision for government aid to financially distressed railroads. Because Congress set up a limited area
for collective bargaining under the Railway Labor Act and has favored in policy
declarations the increased efficiency of the railroad industry, and because alternative
means of protecting the interests of railway labor are available, it seems permissible
to infer that Congress meant to deny the railroads the right to bargain away the
advantages gained before the commissions.
73 See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
7461 Stat. 137-38, 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2), (3), 182 (1958) (excepting
persons subject to the Railway Labor Act from the National Labor Relations Act).
See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & Ind. R.R, 353 U.S. 30, 31 n2
(1957) ; Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232, 237-40 (1949);
Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515, 562-63 (1937).
75 The Railway Labor Act was extensively revised and reenacted on June 21,
1934 (48 Stat. 1185) ; the only sections of the original act not amended or reenacted
at that time were the "award and judgment thereon" section, which has subsequently
been amended (63 Stat. 107) and the "repeal of prior legislation" section, which has
never been amended. Thus, all the pertinent sections of the Railway Labor Act have
been revised since the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act on March 23, 1932 (47
Stat. 70). Note, however, that the Railway Labor Act wording, "rates of pay, rules,
and working conditions," was taken over bodily from the 1926 version of that act
into the 1934 version. 44 Stat 577 (1926); 48 Stat 1185 (1934), as amended, 45
U.S.C. §§ 151-63 (1958).
76 See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30
(1957). See also Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515, 562-63 (1937). The
Court, however, has not been completely consistent in its use of this method of
analysis in all labor cases. Compare American Chain & Cable Co. v. Truck Drivers
& Helpers Union, 68 F. Supp. 54 (D.N.J. 1946), with Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & Ind. KR.-, 353 U.S. 30 (1957). Sections 8(b) (4) (C) and 10
of the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 141, 146 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b) (4)
(C), 160 (1958), provide alternative relief to that denied in the American Chain
case, expressing congressional dissatisfaction with the result, if not the reasoning,
of that case. The doctrine of the Chicago R. case was limited in Manion v. Kansas
City T. Ry., 353 U.S. 927 (1957) (per curiam), to apply only in those cases in
which the controversy had already been submitted to the NRAB for arbitration.
It was still further explained in Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Missouri,
Kan., Tex. R.R., 363 U.S. 528 (1960), holding that in minor disputes the courts
may require the restoration of the status quo ante pending the outcome of arbitration.
In another area, see Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
Compare Teamsters Union v. Yellow Transit Lines, 46 L.R.R.M. 2915 (10th Cir.
1960) (citing Chicago R. case and granting injunction), with A. H. Bull S.S. Co.
v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1957) (denying injunction), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
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the Court's previous determinations in cases where it has found a conflict
77
between the Railway Labor and Norris-LaGuardia Acts.
Whatever the correctness of the present decision, its effect on the future
of railway labor bargaining must be determined. The Court stated that
"nothing the union requested would require the railroad to violate any
valid law or the valid order of any public agency." 78 Not considered was

the effect of a conflict between the proposed provision and a mandatory
order of a state commission requiring abandonment of stations; 79 by
implication, the railway might still disregard that provision upon a determination that state or federal law-and not mere business considerationsrequired it to continue to seek the abandonment or consolidation of positions.80 If the opinion in the instant case is so read, the Court has reached
a balance between competing interests in the railway labor field by per-

mitting the public, through state legislatures and public utility commissions, 8 ' to encourage railroad efficiency.

In the absence of such public

77 See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952) ; Graham
v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944) ; Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n,
supra note 76. The illegality argument was open to the Court in each of these cases
because the conduct which was sought to be enjoined was not within the absolute
ban of § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, but even here "illegality" was not discussed
in the terms of § 7 of the act. And when the Court was forced to face the issue
squarely, it interpreted the express provisions of the Railway Labor Act to take
precedence over the injunction ban. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. &
Ind. R.R1, vtpra note 76.
78 Instant case at 340.
79 Id. at 340 & n.16.
8
0 There is nothing in the present case to prevent state public utility commissions
from interpreting the state laws giving them permission to authorize the discontinuance or consolidation of positions, services, or facilities as giving the railway a
duty to file before these commissions for this permission. And so long as the highest
state court or the state legislature upholds the interpretation of the commission, the
federal courts will have no basis to review these determinations since these matters
are, by the present Court's interpretation, left to the state commissions to decide.
But see California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 561 (1957), citing Railway Employes'
Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956): "A union agreement made pursuant to
the Railway Labor Act has, therefore, the imprimatur of the federal law upon it and,
by force of the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution, could not be
made illegal nor vitiated by any provision of the laws of a State." While both of
these cases involved rights specifically guaranteed by the Railway Labor Act, and
the first involved the question of the applicability of the Railway Labor Act to state
owned railroads, the breadth of the language of the Court in both might lead to a
determination that the states may not put any demand upon the railroads which
would force them to violate any contract clause made under the Railway Labor Act.
81 It is more difficult, in the face of the decision in the instant case, for the railway
or the state public utility commissions to maintain that the railway is required-in
view of the purposes set forth in the Interstate Commerce Act and the legislative
history of the congressional decision to leave the elimination of unneeded facilities
to state agencies-to apply for such eliminations. For while it is possible to read the
present case to hold merely that either the Interstate Commerce Act provisions
created no unlawfulness in the union's demand sufficient to overcome the clear mandate
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act or that the new contract provision applied only to
voluntary actions on the part of the railway and that the law demanded that the
railway submit requests for abandonments to the appropriate commissions in accordance with the national transportation policy, the clear thrust of the argument of the
majority of the Court runs to the fact that the Interstate Commerce Act creates no
binding duty on the part of the railway to seek to eliminate unneeded positions.

1960]

RECENT CASES

action, however, the union retains its right to protect its members' interests
82

in job stability.

82The Court leaves unanswered certain questions which will certainly be raised
in future litigation. First, by finding no illegality in the union's bargaining demands,
it renders moot the question as to whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act ban on labor
injunctions would apply had the demand been illegal. There is some authority for
the proposition that even if the carrier's actions are unlawful under the Interstate
Commerce Act, this would not enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal courts to issue
injunctions beyond the limits set by the Norris-LaGuardia Act East Texas Motor
Freight Lines v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 163 F.2d 10, 12 (5th Cir. 1947) ;
Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Keystone Freight Lines, Inc., 126 F.2d 931, 934
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 645 (1942). On the other hand, had the illegality
arisen under the Railway Labor Act, there is strong authority that this would have
been a basis for holding the Norris-LaGuardia Act inapplicable. E.g., Brotherhood
of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957); Graham v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949).
Second, the Court finds no reason to determine the appropriate action of the parties
where a state public utility commission orders the railway to abandon positions frozen
by the agreement. If the orders were mandatory, one conceptual problem which
faced the majority of the Court would be overcome. In discussing the previous
Court holdings denying to unions the Norris-LaGuardia injunction ban to protect
a union practicing racial discrimination, the Court notes that these courts were called
upon to enjoin not strikes but the enforcement of unlawful labor contracts. However,
there are holdings which suggest that while the Court will enjoin the enforcement
of a contract illegal under federal law, it will not do so if the illegality arises merely
under state law. See Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
Finally, despite a pointed dissent by Mr. Justice Stewart, the Court does not
discuss the basis for federal jurisdiction in this and similar cases. Since the question
was fully argued in the briefs (Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, pp. 46-51; Respondent's Brief on the Merits, pp. 68-70; Petitioners' Reply Brief, pp. 30-31) the
present case may presumably be taken as holding on the proposition that such jurisdiction exists. The question has been discussed by the courts in Toledo, P. & W.R.R.
v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 132 F.2d 265, 272-74 (7th Cir. 1942) (dissenting
opinion), rev'd on other grounds, 321 U.S. 50 (1944). See also Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. New York Cent R.R., 246 F.2d 114 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
877 (1957). For a discussion of the issue as it applies to the present case, see 12
STAN. L. REv. 235, 237-45 (1959).

